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PREFACE
Through the past twelve years in Mennonite Central Committee (MCC)
service, my work touched the issues of material aid and development from
three perspectives. In Vietnam from 1964-67, and to a lesser extent in
Indonesia from 1971-72, I actually planned and carried out material aid
distributions. Working at the central offices for four years as Asia
Director, I grappled again, but from an administrative viewpoint, with how
to help others make best use of material aid. In four succeeding years in
the Executive Office, the perspective shifted once more as I dealt with
MCC's constituency expectations of how and with what inputs human need
might be met. All three categories of experience influenced this study.
My vision for the future of material aid in MCC programs does not
necessarily include increasing or decreasing its use. Rather our goal
should be to read both past experience and the current scene for the
direction they give to future planning. Hopefully this study contributes
to that process.
The following persons deserve special acknowledgement and thanks:
Dr. Warren Prawl, Extension Specialist, Staff Development, Kansas State
University, for guiding me through the project; Dr. Wayne Nafziger and
Dr. Thomas Sloan for additional insights and encouragement; the staffs of
Farrcll Library, Kansas State University, Mennonite Central Committee,
Akron, Pennsylvania and Mennonite Archives, Goshen, Indiana; and my wife,
Doris, for editing skills.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
For thousands of years individuals and communities have banded
together to provide assistance to indigent people. Increasingly governments
and intergovernmental agencies have taken responsibility for providing such
assistance. In spite of the increasing role of government, the North
American sociological, religious and economic climate has spawned thousands
of volunteer organizations to serve the needy at home and overseas. Many
of these organizations are religiously oriented. One such is the Mennonite
Central Committee (MCC)
.
The help provided by MCC and similar voluntary organizations to
needy people takes many forms. The most common form of assistance is food
and clothing to meet immediate needs. But voluntary agencies also seek to
solve more basic problems of the needy through economic development programs,
self-help projects and efforts to combat injustice. This study will attempt
to ascertain what contribution distribution of food and other material aid
supplies makes to long-range development in the MCC program.
Founded in 1920, MCC represents the Mennonite and Brethren in Christ
churches in Canada and the United States. Total membership in these churches
numbers approximately 320,000. Currently MCC has programs in about 40
countries and has a budget of 11 million dollars. Major emphasis has been
James Uorsch, cd., Mennonite Yearbook , Vol. LXIX (Scottdale, Pa.
Mennonite Publishing House, 1978)
,
p. 140.
on a Peace Corps-type volunteer serv lith approximately as
serving two and three-year periods of overseas
During MCC's 58-year history, some evolution in methods of assis-
tance are apparent. One can identify three periods: relief, rehabilitation
and development. The evolution through these three periods was largely
precipitated by historical needs. The first period, relief, lasted from
19 20 until about 1945. Much assistance was provided to famine-suffering
Mennonites in Russia. The period ended with a massive relief program in
war-torn Europe. In the second period, rehabilitation, MCC gave major
attention to rehabilitating refugees within Europe and from Europe to North
and South America. This was also the period in which post-war rehabilita-
tion programs were begun in Indonesia, Taiwan, India/Pakistan, Korea and
Congo. The third period, beginning in the mid 1960s, saw major emphasis
in newly-independent countries of Africa and expanded activity to endemic
poverty areas of Latin America and Asia. Evolution in terms of reference
used in the Workbooks (Annual Reports) of MCC during these periods is
noticeable. Words such as relief and war-sufferers relief evolved to
rehabilitation, service, development and justice.
Material aid consisting of food, clothing, bedding, soap, medical
supplies, etc. has been a significant part of MCC's assistance. Table 1
gives the total amount and type of material aid supplies shipped from 1945
to 1976.
In the past ten years material aid provided approximately one third
of MCC's total resources. Earlier, in the relief and rehabilitation stages,
the percentage was larger. Table 2 provides data on the ratio of material
aid to total resources for the years 1962-1976. These were supplies
contributed by churches and individuals. A question explored later in the
study is whether or not these same individuals and churches would donate an
equivalent amount of cash should the option of donating material aid not be
open to them. In addition to these contributed supplies, MCC distributed
75, SOS, 044 pounds of US P.L. 4S0 foods and 2,194,924 pounds of food from
the Canadian government between 1954 and 1968.
Table 1
Mennonite Central Committee Material Aid Supplies
1945-1976 (in pounds)
Clothing, Bedding Soap, Medical
and Shoes Food and Other Total
20,882,755 62,686,652 10,105,770 95,675,15'
Source: Mennonite Central Committee Workbooks, 1945-1976.
The material resources of MCC were supplemented in several ways by
host governments and the United States Government. The latter provided
reimbursement for ocean freight to authorized voluntary agencies for
material aid shipments. In the last ten years this has amounted to approxi-
2
mately $500,000 per year for MCC. The value of host government contribu-
tions were usually not recorded in the reports sent to the MCC headquarters
offices but have included the following: in-country transportation of goods,
warehousing and engineering skills for work projects.
2
Reported by John Ilostetler, MCC Material Aid Director, in conver-
sation with the author, April 18, 1978.
rable 2
Ratio of Material Aid to clash Contributions
Total Con- Cash Con- $ Value of Percent
Year tributions tributions Material Aid Material Aid
1962 4,240,584 2,551,550 1,709,054 40.5
19o 5 4,667,285 5,047,428 1,619,857 54.7
1964 5,957, 1S4 5,S04,21S 2,072,966 54.9
1965 5,955,446 5,760,927 2,174,519 55.6
1966 4,215,149 1,961,272 2,251,877 55.4
1967 5,001,992 2,256, 166 2,765,826 55 . 5
196S 4,919,648 2,455,201 2,4S5,947 50.5
1969 4,775,761 2,645,092 2,128,669 44.6
1970 6,271,915 2,752,245 3,559,672 56.4
1971 6,501,585 5, 505, 565 2,796,220 44.4
1972 6,82S,S79 3,986,540 2,842,559 41.6
19 75 6,458,365 4,525,261 2,155,104 55.1
1974 9,295,911 5,575,961 5,721,950 40.0
1975 10,451,457 6,965,589 3,467, S48 55.2
1976 10,946,950 7,757,74S 5,209,202 29.5
Source: Mennonite Central Committee Workbooks, 1962-1976.
Philosophically and practically, MCC like other voluntary' organi-
zations, faces the dilemma of determining programs on the basis of what
supporting churches and individuals wish to give, or on the basis of what
is of utmost benefit in needy countries. This dilemma is similar to that
which the US government faces in its decision to utilize surplus commo-
dities in food aid and development programs.
Purpose of Studv
.—*- c—
The purpose of this study was to determine the degree to which MCC
was successful in fostering economic development through its material aid
program. What have been the major contributing factors to success or
failure in given countries? On the basis of findings, suggestions were
made on how MCC could improve the development potential of the material
aid program.
The study examined these contributing factors: (1) Were certain
types of material aid more appropriate for development purposes than others?
(2) What type of local organization was best able to utilize material aid?
(5) What factor did the interests, abilities and experience of personnel
play? (4) Has MCC or the local agency using the material aid identified
clear project goals? (5) Can material aid be more successfully utilized
following a disaster than in responding to long-tern poverty? (6) What
structures and resources are necessary to conduct work projects using food?
Need for the Study
In its 58-year history', MCC contributed 95,675,157 pounds of
material aid to needy individuals. In addition approximately 75 million
pounds of US government foods were used in the program. During this time
no overall study was done to determine the effects of the aid. No study
was made on whether the material was only temporarily improving the well-
being of the recipients or whether it was contributing to their long-range
development. During the 58-year histoiy, a number of studies were made on
individual country' programs but no specific study was made of the contri-
bution material aid makes to development.
A second reason for the study is that MCC's Executive Committee
asked for greater clarification on the role of material aid. They identify
a growing disquiet in the supporting constituency concerning MCC's inability
to use larger amounts of material aid in its programs.
A third reason tor the studs' relates to discussion MCC had with
representatives of Church World Service and Lutheran World Relief in TJ76
and 1977. The three agencies discussed engaging in a major study on the
use of material aid in development and negotiated with a consulting firm
to do field research in Brazil, India and Sudan. The study was dropped
because of high cost. It was not the purpose of this study to pick up
where the proposed study terminated, but to narrow the scope of inquiry to
MCC only and three countries in which MCC has used material aid.
A fourth reason for the study, which holds some urgency, relates to
plans for MCC to increase food aid in its program. This is due to the
creation of MCC (Canada) Food Bank. At the Bank's formation, it was anti-
cipated that 1.5 million bushels of wheat might be stockpiled for use in
times of acute shortage. Major funding for this project will come from the
Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) . Since its formation, the
amount of wheat entering the Bank is not meeting projected levels. Still
the amount available to MCC, the planned channel of distribution, will be
significant.
A fifth and most important reason for the study relates to a
possible worldwide food shortage. Numerous studies indicate that a number
of third world countries will experience modest to severe food shortages
between now and the year 2000. If these forecasts arc accurate, voluntary
agencies such as MCC will be involved in large-scale food distribution
programs. Maximizing development efforts through these food distribution
programs can only benefit recipients in the long run. Leai-nings from past
material aid programs should be appropriated to future efforts.
This study can contribute to efforts currently underway at MCC to
prepare contingency plans for food relief needs in areas prone to food
shortages. One person in South Asia and another in the Sahel region of
Africa have been assigned this task.
Method of Studv
The study concentrated on two primary sources of information:
(1) Literature on the subject of relief, disaster response and food aid in
development programs and (2) data from the files of the Mennonite Central
Committee. The above two sources were supplemented with a brief question-
naire sent to 15 persons who were administratively responsible for MCC's
material aid programs in the three countries of the study. The literature
review focused first on materials related to the P.L. 480 program and
second, on disaster response studies.
Since it was impossible to analyze all of MCC's material aid pro-
grams through 58 years, three representative countries were chosen for
analysis: Haiti, India and Jordan. These countries were chosen for the
following reasons: (1) each country received a significant amount of
material aid; (2) aid continued for a decade or more; (5) in each country
MCC was involved with a development program in addition to the material
aid activity; (4) MCC was primarily responsible for utilisation of the aid
in these countries rather than merely allocating it to another agency for
distribution; (5) each country received a variety of material aid items;
(6) material aid in each country was used in response to both disasters
and endemic poverty needs; (7) the three countries represent different
economic levels, geographic locations and political structures.
The period of study was from 1962 to 1976. This L5-year period
spanned tiraes ot shortages in each country and period irldwide surplus
and shortages. It included at least three different MCC directors in each
country. This 15-year span covered times of substantial material aid ship-
ments to each country as well as times of limited shipments.
Pe fin it ion of Terms
Material aid : Non-cash resources such as wheat, canned beef,
bedding or hand tools used in relief or development programs.
The literature frequently uses the term "material resources."
Development : "... the process by which both persons and
societies come to realize the full potential of human life
in a context of social justice, with an emphasis on self-
reliance; economic growth being seen as one of the means
for carrying forward this process."
Re 1 i c
f
: Aid in the form of money or material necessities to assist
the poor, usually for a temporary period.
Voluntary Agency : Private, nongovernmental agency organized to
provide assistance for needy people, particularly those
overseas in the context of this study.
Food- for -work : Form of assistance in which a laborer receives a
specified amount of food for a specified amount of work done.
Cash-for-work : Similar to the above except that the payment is
made with cash instead of food.
lidgar Stoesz, Thoughts on Development , Development Monograph Series
No. 1 (Akron, Pa.: Mennonite Central Committee, 1976), p. 2.
Work pro ice t : Either of the two preceding items.
Successful project: One that has evoked observable community
participation and ownership and continues to serve its
projected purpose a year or more after its inception.
CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF nil; LITERATURE
Typos of hitcratu iv
During the past throe decades there has been a steady stream of
literature on development theory, planning and execution, much of it
devoted to the macro-planning level.
Literature on the subject of food aid and disaster relief assis-
tance appeared primarily in two time blocks. The first came in the late
1950s and early 1960s, largely as a result of the P.L. 4S0 program in 1954.
This now food resource precipitated a series of studies on programmatic
subjects by the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations
and numerous studies on the impact of food aid on development by agri-
cultural economists.
A second wave of studies on disaster relief and food aid occurred
in the mid-1970s. This followed a period of depleted world grain stocks,
the oil embargo of the OPLC countries and the World Food Conference in
November, 1974. The mid-1970s also produced a few studies on disaster
response as a consequence of the Sahcl famine and the Bangladesh disaster
and civil war.
The voluntary* agencies have been particularly deficient in publishing
analyses of their programs. This is understandable in that they are action-
oriented agencies. Further, any reports that have been published tend to
enhance an agency's image in order to elicit support rather than present a
critical analysis. Materials published by voluntary' agencies tend to
10
11
originate from home offices rather than field programs. Consequently much
4
specificity is lost. It may be that numerous internal program studies are
taking place, but that voluntary agencies lack the interest or mechanism to
give them wider circulation. If this is so, it is most unfortunate because
the findings could be beneficial to other development agencies, both private
and governmental.
Few studies were made on the use of nonfood items in either relief
or development programs. Yet, in the case of several voluntary agencies,
distribution of blankets, clothing, medical supplies and hand tools are a
significant part of their programs.
Need for Food Aid
Brown and Borgstrom, along with many other writers, describe the
impact of growing population on world food supply. Agile, using UN data
published in 1975, points out accelerated population growth of the past two
decades and its downward trend only at the turn of the next century. He
says :
The world population, increasing at an average annual
rate of only 0.5 percent throughout the 19th century, and
0.8 percent in the first half of the 20th century, con-
siderably accelerated its growth during the decade of the
1950's, attaining a rate of 1.7 percent per annum. The
rate of growth of the world's population rose still higher
during the 1960 's and is currently estimated at about 2.0
Morris Davis, Civil Wars and the Politics of International Relief
(New York: Pracger, 1975), p. 76.
Lester R. Brown with Erik P. Eckholm, By Bread Alone (New York:
Pracger, 1974J , pp. 55-44.
Georg Borgstrom, The Food and Population Oi lemma (North Scituatc,
Mass.: Duxbury Press, 1975), pp. 15-28.
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percent per annum. According to the "medium" variant
ot' the latest United Nations projections, the total
world population may continue to grow at an annual
rate oi' 2.0 percent until L980. A downward trend
would then start, ending with a value of 1.6 percent
per annum at the end of the century.'
The "medium" variant has the world population at 6.4 billion by the year
:ooo.
o
Brown' emphasizes not only the impact of growing population on food
supply, but also the impact increased affluence of the wealthy nations and
the elites of some of the poor countries has on the food supply. The
wealthy demand more of their nutrients from animal products, fruits and
highly processed and packaged foods.
9 10
George and Lappe and Collins document how the institutional and
political structures reinforce the well-being of the wealthy countries and
poor-country elites to deprive the majority of people in the third world
from utilizing limited resources to the best advantage for their own
dietary needs.
Pi-cdictions are that, at best, overall world food supplies will be
tight in the next several decades resulting in malnutrition and starvation
7
Roger Agile, "Seminar on Population, Food and Agricultural Develop-
ment," Food Fnough or Starvation for Millions
,
cd. Douglas Ensminger (New
Delhi: Tata McGraw-Hill, 1977), p. 217.
o
Brown, loc. cit.
9Susan George, How the Other Half Dies: The Real Reasons for horld
Hunger (Montclair: Allanheld, Osmun § Co., 1977), pp. 46-64.
Frances Moore Lappe and Joseph Collins, Food First: Beyond the
Myth of Scarcity (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977), pp. 181-205.
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for many in poorer countries. A 1974 Central Intelligence Agency report
says :
Trying to provide adequate world food supplies will
become a problem of over-riding priority in the years and
decades immediately ahead . . . and a key role in any
successful effort must fall to the US. Even in the most
favorable circumstances predictable, with increased devo-
tion of scarce resources and technical expertise, the
outcome will be doubtful; in the event of adverse change
in climate, the outcome will be grave.
^
The need for accelerated food production and more equitable distri-
bution is voiced in all the literature reviewed. The need for greater con-
centration of this production in needy countries is also undisputed.
Uncertainty arises, however, as to whether food aid from the developed
countries contributes or detracts from that development.
Types of Ass is tance
Food aid to needy countries is viewed as a temporary but necessary
form of aid. The persistent need for food and its ready availability during
the past three decades gave it a certain degree of permanence. An important
FAO study in 1962 projected that food aid would be needed for a transitional
12period of five to ten years. Given the past history, it is difficult to
see a US foreign aid package without a percentage comprised of food aid.
Ideally, the form of aid most beneficial to a needy country is cash
13
grants. The country is then free to spend aid in a way which most supports
CIA, Potential Implications of Trends in World Population, Food
Production and Climate (Washington, lhe Office, 1974J , p. 1.
1°
"FAO, Development Through Food (Rome: FAO, 1962)
,
p. 56.
Class lecture, Dr. Patrick Gormley, International Economics, I
Semester, 19 76-77, Kansas State University, Manhattan, Kansas.
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its own development plans, it" food Is needed, it can purchase desired food
for the lowest price. Remaining cash aid can be allocated Tor other
development needs. Unfortunately most needy countries do not receive aid
in such a liquid form. If cash is granted it is usually in the form of
short or long-term loans. Often it is tied to purchases of equipment or
technology from the donor country.
Much of the United States Foreign Aid of the past three decades
was in the form of food aid under the P.L. 480 program. Since the early
19b0s food aid accounted for almost one third of all the US's official
1.1 * ~ • 14development assistance.
The next section will discuss the P.L. 480 program in more detail,
but first it is important to look at the overall benefits and disadvantages
of various types of aid. Little needs to be mentioned of the need for
food in times of emergency. That need is universally recognized. More
disagreement persists on whether food aid can be used for development
purposes. The following are generally recognized contributions of food
aid:
1. Increases the total amount of development aid available
2. Assists in emergencies
5. Raises consumption levels
4. Improves nutritional levels
5. Resolves temporary difficulties such as, balance of payments,
budget deficits, inflationary pressures
6. Makes possible new development projects via direct capital
improvement projects or via expenditure of counterpart funds
in the case of P.L. 480.
Food aid also benefits the donor country in the following ways:
14
Emma Rothschild, "It's Time to Lnd Food for Peace," New York
Times Magazine, March 15, 19 77, p. 45.
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1. Improves position of surplus country- -eliminates storage
costs
2. May create export markets
5. Increases total amount of development aid available.
At the same time one needs to balance benefits with potential harmful
effects
:
1. May create new needs and tastes which can only be satisfied
with imports; e.g., milk, wheat in Subshara Africa
2. Disrupts production cycles
5. Cuts into potential exports of other nations
4. Substitutes for more beneficial cash aid
5. Deters a country's own investment in the agricultural sector
6. Reduces incentives for local farmers. 1 ^
Public Law 480 Program
A study of food aid must include a review of the P.L. 4S0 program
since it played such a significant role in many countries during the past
25 years. Table 5 gives the dollar value of the P.L. 4S0 program from
1954 to 1974.
A brief look at the P.L. 4S0 program is relevant in this study for
two reasons. First, numerous analytical studies have been done on the
impact of P.L. 480 food distribution programs on development in the third
world. Second, the P.L. 480 program has had a provision under Title II
which allows food distributions through qualified voluntary agencies.
Sommer reports that more than one quarter of voluntary agency income in
1975-1976 was in the form of P.L. 480 food aid and its related
Jan Dessau, The Role of Multilateral Food Aid Programs , World
Food Program Studies, No. 4 [Rome: l'AO, 1905J , pp. 5-10.
John G. Sommer, Beyond Charity: U.S. Voluntary Aid for a Changing
Third World (Washington, D.C.: Overseas Development Council, 1977), p. 45.
lb
transportation value. MCC took advantage of this provision during the late
1950s and 1960s.
Table 3
Annual Value of Public Law ISO Shipments
(Dollar amounts in millions)
Calendar year Total P.L. 480
1954 (July to December) $48
1955 505
1956 890
1957 974
195S 954
1959 875
1960 1,187
1961 1,125
1962 1,507
1965 1,472
1964 1,578
1965 1,504
1966 1,265
1967 1,217
1968 1,175
1969 1,021
1970 1,021
1971 952
1972 1,107
1975 750
19 74 (preliminary) 760
a
Source: Ross 13. Talbot, The World Food Problem and US Food Policies:
19 72 -19 7b, A Readings Book (/Vines: Iowa State University Press, 1977),
p. 255
.
Rothschild describes the tremendous importance of the P.L. 4S0
program to the United States and the world, "Twenty years ago, the United
States Congress wrote a law which has changed the diet and political life
17
of half the world."
1 '
Historically, four purposes can be listed for the P.L. 4S0 program:
L. A means to get rid of surplus food
2. A way of feeding hungry people
3. An instrument of political and economic policy
4. A tool to expand foreign markets
During the 24-year evolution of the program, different purposes were empha-
sized at different times. Provisions of the 1954 law and subsequent
revisions are briefly suimnarized as follows:
Title I : Authorizes agreements with friendly nations, or
organizations in such nations, for the sale of
agricultural commodities for foreign currencies.
Title II : Provides food assistance for emergency situations,
grants of food for economic and community develop-
ment projects for needy countries and for voluntary
agencies' use in needy countries.
Title III : Allows for the use of food commodities in state, .„
federal or private programs in the United States.
The primary intent of the original act was surplus disposal. By
I960 the program was increasingly shifting to foreign economic development.
By the early 1960s substantial amounts of local currencies generated from
the sale of P.L. 480 commodities were being designated for development
19
projects. The shift away from surplus disposal toward economic and
political considerations became more pronounced with the 1966 revision.
The 1966 Act officially changed the title of the law to Food for Peace.
Rothschild, loc. cit.
1
8
Robert G. Stanley, Food for Peace: Hope and Reality of US Food
Aid (New York: Gordon and breach, 1975), pp. 84-98.
19
Uma K. Srivastava and others, Food Aid and International Feonomic
Growth (2d ed.; Ames : Iowa State University Press, 1975], p. 57.
.Controversy about i t ^ ultimate effects, both political and economic,
plagued the P.L. ISO prog] Lnce Its origin. For purposes of this study
°o
only quest ions about its economic impact will be noted. Met trick" indi-
cates that there has been little conflict over the emergency aid portion
of the program. In such aid, long-term development and cost effectiveness
are of little concern. Speed, efficiency of delivery and good administra-
tion are of primary importance in this form of life-saving aid. The portion
of P.L. 480 food spent for emergency purposes has been minimal, however.
A second form of P.L. 480 aid that received minimal criticism is
aid provided for projects. Such aid is allocated to voluntary agencies,
governments or authorized private agencies in needy countries. Food-for-
21
work projects often result from this type of assistance. Mettrick notes
the only major danger to project aid is the possibility of replacing diets
of locally-produced foods with diets of imported foods which are not as
well balanced. Like emergency aid, the portion of P.L. 4S0 food used in
project aid was small.
The bulk of P.L. 480 aid was distributed through commercial channels
and was the object of major criticism. Size of the program rather than
method of distribution was the primary object of the criticism. In this
form of aid P.L. 480 food is given or sold to another country on generous
terms. Provisions frequently allow 30 years to repay. US political
interest rather than a recipient country's needs were usually factors in
establishing repayment rates and schedules. Until 1970, repayment could
20
Hal Mettrick, Food Aid mid Britain (London: Overseas Development
Institute, 1969)
, p. 53.
21
Ibid., p. 54.
19
be made in local currencies. 'litis provision created sizeable US-controlled
local currencies in a nur.ibcr of countries. These currencies became a
valuable tool for economic development. They were also a factor in
encouraging inflationary spending as noted later in this section.
22Schultz" set out the basic argument on the development impact of
food aid in the 1960s. His contention, based on studies of the P.L. 480
program in India, indicated that these food supplies depressed Indian grain
prices, resulting in reduced local production and investment in agriculture
by local producers and the Indian government itself.
Though his study has remained as one of the main bulwarks against
the food aid program, several studies soon appeared to challenge his
conclusions. Witt, in a study of the P.L. 4S0 program in Israel noted,
"The impact of P.L. 4S0 imports on international agricultural production,
surprisingly was to stimulate rather than discourage agricultural produc-
es
tion."~ Witt's evaluations of programs in Colombia, Pakistan and India
were not as positive as that of Israel, but in none of these countries did
he report that the program had a drastic negative effect. He says, "Either
a sweeping attack on the program or a comprehensive defense will miss the
24
mark. There are too many individual exceptions.""
22
""Theodore W. Schultz, "Value of US Farm Surpluses to Underdeveloped
Countries," Journal of Farm Economics
,
XLII (December, 1960).
Lawrence W. Witt, "Development through Food Grants and Con-
cessional Sales," Agriculture in Liconomic Development , eds . Carl Eicher
and Lawrence Witt (New fork: McGraw-Hill, 19o4J , p. 54o.
24
Ibid.
, p. 354.
>5
Khatkhatc tried to relate Schultz's Lons by put* jod
aid Ln a much broader context. He attempted to study Li . ill Lmj
upon the stability of agricultural prices, Identifying stability of agri-
cultural prices as a key factor in promoting development. Food imports
actually helped to stabilize prices rather than having the opposite effect.
'6
Aioin's" study of Egyptian agriculture concluded that US aid of
wheat and wheat flour did not have an adverse effect upon Egypt's wheat
production
.
The controversy has not abated in the decade and a half since the
27
early 1960s. If anything, it has intensified. Bhatia,~ in a study of US
food shipments to India, concludes that low grain prices served as a dis-
incentive to investment in the agricultural sector and an urban bias in
India's development planning and that the spending of counterpart funds
was inflationary.
Isenman and Singer (1977) in a major study of the issue state:
There is sufficient concern about the possible harmful
effects of food aid on domestic food production that many
economists recommend less or no food aid (other than,
perhaps, for emergencies) even in cases where nutritional
and other human needs are strom_iest.^
9 *"
D. R. Khatkhatc, "Some Notes on the Real Effects of Foreign
Surplus Disposal in Underdeveloped Economies," Quarterly .Journal of
Economics
, LXXVI (May, 1902), pp. 180-196.
20
Galal A. Amin, Food Supply and Economic Development with Special
Emphasis on Egypt (New York: A.M. Kelly, 1900), p. 90.
27
B. M. Bhatia, Famines in India (London: Asia Publishing House,
1907)
, pp. 142-147.
28
Paul J. Isenman and II. W. Singer, "Food Aid: Disincentive Effects
and Their Policy Implications," Economic Development and Cultural Change
,
XXV (June, 1972), pp. 205-257.
21
A 1977 report from Bangladesh, indicates that large US food ship-
ments served as disincentives to government investments in the agricultural
29
sector in recent years.
Conversely, Mellor argues in a 1975 article:
Food aid can play a major role in encouraging low
income nations to choose a strategy of economic develop-
ment which will provide accelerated growth in employment
(and, consequently, broadened participation of the poor
in economic growth) , effectively, focus attention on
increasing agricultural production and, eventually, reduce
rates of population growth. 30
Like Mellor, a 1976 study by Sinha concluded:
There is no doubt that the massive US food aid
programme not only played a major role in alleviating
misery during emergencies but also assisted economic
development in some countries by relieving inflationary
pressures and the foreign exchange constraint; but
because of its close association with US foreign policy
its full potentialities were never realized. 31
A Witt and Eicher 1964 study puts the controversy in proper pers-
pective. They show that food aid's positive or negative impact is not
inherent in the food aid itself, but is rather a result of the recipient
country's plans and policies in reference to that aid. A country with
effective public administration and a well-conceived development program
can use food aid effectively. A country which does not have strong support
for the central government and gives high priority to current consumption
29
Kai Bird and Susan Goldmark, "The Food Aid Conspiracy," New
Internationalist
,
March 19 77, pp. 20-21.
John W. Mellor, "Food Aid and Long Run Food-Population Balances,"
Columbia Journal of World Business
,
X (Fall, 19 75), p. 29.
31
Radha Sinha, Food and Poverty: The Political Fconomv of Confron-
I :
tation (London: Croom Helm, 1976), p. 122.
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will not have positive development results from food aid.
Clearly, the positive or negative development impact results more
from a given country's willingness and ability to use the food aid effec-
tively than from the food aid itself.
Disaster and Famine Literature
FAO's World Food Studies, Commodity Series and Nutritional Studies,
all published in the early 1960s, sought to give guidance to developing
countries and the various United Nations' sponsored programs in using food
aid for development purposes. These studies are helpful but lack sufficient
field experience to make them enduring guides.
G. B. Masefield stands out in the 1960s and in United Nations circles
as the authority on famines and disaster response programs. His two studies,
Famine: Its Prevention and Relief and Food and Nutrition Procedures in
54
Times of Disaster established procedures that were followed by United
Nations agencies throughout the 1960s and into the 1970s. These studies
emphasized a number of principles that are applicable to smaller private
agencies. Among them are the following:
1. Historically, food requirements in disasters have usually
been overestimated.
°*"L. W. Witt and C. Eicher, The F.ffcct of United States Agricul -
tural Sun -) 1 us Disposal Programs on Recipient Countries
,
Michigan State
University Research Bulletin, No. 2 (East Lansing: Michigan State Univer-
sity Press, 1964)
, p. 65.
G. B. Masefield, Famine: Its Prevention and Relief (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1965).
54
G. B. Masefield, Food and Nutritional Procedures in Times of
Disaster
,
Nutritional Studies, No. 21 (Rome: Food and Agricultural
Organization, 1967).
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2. Food supplies introduced into famine areas need not be the
exact type normally eaten by the population, but they must
be acceptable.
5. Food supplies should be able to be cooked with local
equipment.
4. Any processing required must be able to be done locally.
5. "There is also psychological value in making a specially
large issue of relief foods, or supplying special foods,
at times of festivals which the people are accustomed to
celebrate by heavy eating or by eating special foods.
Attention to these matters can make a significant contri-
bution to maintaining morale during a famine." 00
6. Two methods can be followed in ending relief. Both are
difficult. This stage often creates the most vexing
problems in relief administration. The first method is
to sort out the most needy and supply them only. The
second is simply to reduce the ration of all. Sometimes
a combination of both methods is possible.
7. Efforts should be made to prevent farmers from eating
their seed. This can best be done by providing relief
foodstuffs before the famine becomes too critical.
8. Helping farmers preserve livestock can be extremely
important in the relief effort as well as the rehabili-
tation stage.
9. Lists of suitable work projects should be maintained in
famine-prone areas.
As G. B. Masefield set the direction for famine relief programs in
the 1960s, so Jean Mayer and Alan Berg set it in the 19 70s. Their writings
and those of others, particularly relating to nutritional concerns in
famine relief, are found in a publication by the Swedish Nutritional Foun-
, ,. 36dation.
35
Ibid., p. 45.
G. Blix, Y. Hofvaiuler and B. Yahlquist, eds
. ,
Famine: A Symposium
Dealing with Nutrition and Relief Operations in Times of Disaster (Uppsala:
Wiksclls, 19 71).
24
Berg highlights these lessons from the Bihar famine experience
that have applicability to small private agencies:
1. The Bihar famine proved that there is no substitute for
strong leadership in relief operations.
2. A manual of relief operations can save much time in the
early stages of organization of a program.
5. Too much debate can be given to what type of foods to give-
in times of disaster. The important thing is to simply
provide something to eat. Food should be simple and easy
to cook with minimum of utensils.
4. In times of crisis it is better to utilise existing insti-
tutions for organizing distribution points rather than
creating new ones.
5. Schools tend to be the best outlet for feeding operations.
6. The Bihar famine proved that it is possible to design a
relief operation with development orientation.
7. Information and communications arc very important in a
famine situation.
Mayer ' makes many of the same points as do Berg and Masefield,
particularly emphasizing the importance of good communications, early
assessment of need, good planning and the economics of disaster relief.
40
Davis' study on the peculiar relief needs emerging out of civil
war situations adds some helpful insights to the previous studies. His
Alan Berg, "Famine Contained: Notes and Lessons from the Bihar
Experience," Famine: A Symposium Dealing with Nutrition and Relief Opera -
tions in Times of Disaster
,
eds. G. Blix, Y. Hofvander and B. Vahlquist
(Uppsala: Wiksells, 1971), pp. 115-129.
TO
Jean Mayer, "Coping with Famine," Foreign Affairs
,
LI 1
1
(October, 19 74), pp. 98-120.
59
Jean Mayer, "Management of Famine Relief," Science
,
May 9, 1975,
pp. 571-577.
40
Morris Davis, Civil V>ars and the Politics of International Relict
(New York: Praegcr, 1975).
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stud)- documents the political character of all relict. Voluntary agencies
and intergovernmental agencies espouse their nonpolitical motives, but they
are seen by local government and by recipients of relief as highly
political
.
41
Sheets and Morris document how the governmental, intergovern-
mental and private agencies were slow and somewhat inept in responding to
the disaster in the Sahel in the 1970s. The authors appeal for a better
international information network to provide early warnings of disasters.
4?
Burley " calls not only for a better information system but also
for better coordination and administration of disaster relief. He suggests:
A small secretariat, attached to the UN, could serve
as a clearing house for several major donors, and maintain
a handful of skilled and internationally acceptable admini-
strators . 43
44
Hagen documents unnecessary and inappropriate aid given to
disaster victims in Peru and East Pakistan. He appeals for less emergency
type relief aid (baby food, blankets, milkpowder, medicines) and more
emphasis upon local purchases and development assistance. He notes the
reason for such aid--high visibility—but urges donors and administrative
personnel to downgrade the emergency phase of relief.
Herman Sheets and R. Morris, Disaster in the Desert: The Failure
of International Relief in the West African Drought (Washington, D.C.: The
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1974)
.
42
Lawrence Anderson Burley, "Disaster Relief Administration in the
Third World," International Development Review , XV (October, 1975),
pp. 8-12.
Ibid., p. U.
44
Toni Hagen, "Problems of International Emergency Aid," Swiss
Re v iew of W o r I d A f fa i rs , October, 1975, pp. 25-26.
Green ' analyzes the present Kapha ird I intei itional
relief and proposes that all countries and agencies agree to a Geneva-t
convention and says:
The fundamental element of the convention be a
statement of principle asserting the co::inion responsibility
of all neonle and eovemincn ts to provide protection and
relict' to the victi::is oi natural disasters. 40
Methods would be agreed upon to provide relief under varying political
situations
.
45
Stephen Green, International Disaster Relief: Toward a Responsive
Sy_s tern (New York: McGraw-Hill, 19 77) .
Ibid.
, p . Ob.
CHAPTER 5
THREE -COUNTRY ANALYSIS
The study now turns from the macro to the micro level; from the
impact of large government food aid programs to the modest program effort
of MCC . Further, the field of study is narrowed to only three of 40
countries in which MCC is engaged. Though some reference will be made to
all material aid inputs used by MCC in these countries, the major focus is
on food aid, particularly wheat. Before looking in depth at the material
aid programs and experiences in Haiti, Jordan and India, a brief profile
and program overview of each country is provided.
HAITI
MCC became involved in this small Caribbean country in 1957. The
focus of the program is the operation of a district health center at Crande
Riviere Du Nord, 50 kilometers south of Cape Haitian, on the northern coast
of the country. A formal agreement with the Ministry of Health, signed in
1959, committed MCC to operate the hospital/clinic for five years. Renewal
took place at regular intervals. The most recent renewal of the contract
provided for much larger Haitian input and a substantially reduced role for
MCC.
From the beginning, MCC viewed its role as considerably broader than
that of operating the hospital/clinic. In an initial letter of instruction
to the Haiti country director, MCC administrator for Caribbean programs
said
:
27
Additionally, we would Like you to survey the total
needs oi that area and write up a CD. program per -.pectus
which describes the urgent needs of the G.R. larg<
community together with a description of proposed program
to meet these needs and the supplies, budget and personnel
needed thereto."*'
The resulting community development program took on more importance
and absorbed more expatriate personnel than the clinic/hospital. A 1967
Annual Report listed these projects in addition to the clinic/hospital and
public health work: water projects, school construction, rat eradication,
gardening, rabbits, poultry, hogs, library, educational assistance, craft
productions, veterinary services and cannery. The Haitian program attempted
to operate in a classical community development style with the MCC staff
serving as a catalyst to the community in their process of economic develop-
ment. In 1970, the MCC director stated the program emphasis as follows:
The purpose of the MCC program is to establish in
Grande Riviere Du N'ord and surrounding areas the
,„
Community Development process of problem-solving.
MCC material aid, along with cash and foreign personnel, was seen
as a resource to the community development effort. Though material aid
input was not large in comparison to cash and personnel inputs, it was
still significant. Table 4 gives the total number of pounds and typo of
material aid shipped to Haiti from 1962 to 1976. Approximately one fourth
of this amount was shipped to Haiti for other relief and service organi-
zations operating in Haiti. About one half of the amount reaching Grande
Riviere Du Nord was for the hospital/clinic program. MCC had a very close
47
Letter from Edgar Stocsz, Director Voluntary Service, to Arlm
Hunsberger, MCC Haiti Director, August 15, 19b2
.
48
Paul Dcrstine, Three Year Community Development Plan, July 9,
1970.
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working relationship with CARE and Church World Service in Haiti and drew
on their P.L. 480 sources rather than importing its own grain.
MCC originally planned to move on to other need thin the couru
after the government was able to operate the health facility, and the
community development process had built up momentum in the surrounding area.
But, the government was slow to provide personnel and management resources
necessary to operate the clinic/hospital, and poverty persisted among the
people. In 1962, the MCC Chairman on a visit to Haiti said:
It appears now that MCC assistance will need to continue
to some degree for another 3-5 years, beyond the July 5, 1964
agreement termination date.^9
MCC did stay, in fact continues working in community development
at present. Material aid has all but ceased to be shipped to Haiti. But
in spite of the large volume of aid provided by United States government,
private and international agencies, Haiti is still listed on the United
Nation's list of most severely affected nations.
Use of Material Aid
Of the three countries studied, nowhere was the question of material
aid use more vigorously discussed than in reference to Haiti. From some
correspondence it appears that debate on the subject with reference to Haiti
was more vigorous than for any of the 40 or more countries in which MCC had
programs.
Discussion was not only evident in letters and reports from Haiti,
but radical changes in approach to the use of material aid by MCC directors
49
C. N. Hostettcr Jr. and lidgar Stoesz, Haiti Report, November 6-16,
1962.
31
in Haiti reflect tins debate. Following are some reasons for the debate
and varying responses during the 15-year period.
On the positive side:
(1) Haiti had obvious needs. People were hungry, ill clothed and
illiterate. Material aid could be used to ameliorate these needs.
(2) Other agencies, CARE and Church World Service, were using substantial
quantities of material aid, particularly P.L. 480 commodities. Could not
MCC do the same? (3) There was substantial need for development activities-
roads to be built, schools to be constructed, reforestation and terracing
needed. Could not food-for-work be used to effect these objectives?
(4) Financial resources were limited. Could not food-for-work projects
serve as a resource for development in lieu of funds?
On the negative side:
(1) Though Haiti experienced frequent minor disasters during the
15-year period, there was no overwhelming disaster that invited a large-
scale MCC relief effort. Further, larger agencies such as CARE and Church
World Service were better able and more willing to respond to these needs.
(2) Because much of the population lived at marginal levels, if material
aid was given one could not envision a termination point. Aid would help
temporarily but would contribute little to long-term solutions.
(5) Material aid would exacerbate patronage, a practice already rampant
in Haiti. (4) MCC's geographic base was rather narrow. All abuses of
material aid activity were highly visible and an obvious caution to expanded
activity.
This debate was reflected by Dr. Merrill Ewert, MCC Agricultural
Director in Zaire, when he visited the Haitian program in 1976. He said:
52
1 have not settled In my mind the role of material
aid in our third world Lnv nt, but I wa ed to
ask myself some hard questions as I looked al I inde
Ri viere program. 50
Hie debate on Legitimate use of material aid was accentuated by I .
fact that the Haiti program was conceived primarily as one of development.
This was in sharp contrast to the program in Jordan and even in India where
there was a much greater recognition of the need for material aid. In
Haiti, the "hand out" philosophy seemed to clash sharply with the "develop-
ment of peoples and communities" philosophy. Workers were sent to Haiti
with skills and assignments in community development, public health and
agriculture in contrast to Jordan where persons were sent with the sole
responsibility of administering the material aid program. Few people
wanted to take out time from their agricultural development or nursing
duties to oversee material aid distributions.
Material aid was listed with resources available to communities
wishing to engage in development projects as was technical services, cash,
and specialized personnel. The fact that so few communities requested
material aid, or requested it on terms which MCC could provide, may be the
most legitimate indicator of the value of material aid in the Haitian
context.
Tnc negative effects of the material aid program were mentioned in
various reports. In 19 75 the MCC director reported:
Material aid has not been the best part of the program
here. Many observations indicate that material aid has had
negative effects on communities developing their own
resources . 51
Dr. Merrill Ewert, "Visit to Grande Riviere Du Xord, Haiti,"
November 2, 1976.
° Vernon King, "1975 Quarterly Report."
JJ
In 1970, the director wrote:
. . .
I am advancing an economic principle of community
development, which states in effect, that money properly
injected into a sluggish economy does more for development
of that locality or country, as the case may be, than free
imported goods. It would seem that free imported goods
could do nothing more than depress the economy by creating
less demand. D -
But in spite of numerous negative comments, there were some positive
reports about the contribution material aid was making to the program. In
a 1975 quarterly report the director said:
Food-for-work in this rural development effort has
been an important factor. It is not used here as an
inducement to community participation. Rather, food is
used to encourage the process and comes only after the
community has taken the initiative .... The staff
here does not want to think that the development program
is totally dependent on the Food-for-Peace program.
However we recognize the difficulty for community members
to give a day or a week at a time to community projects
without having some kind of assistance. A day not spent _,
in the garden means little food in the house that evening.
One type of material aid project which received broad acclaim in
Haiti and by the MCC staff was the importing of plastic pipe. Numerous
springs were capped and potable water brought to villages with plastic
pipe. As part of the community development process, villagers were
required to put up a certain amount of money for the cement and pipe before
MCC made its contribution. Likewise villagers were expected to contribute
the major amount of unskilled labor for the project. This type of material
aid project was seen by the MCC staff as clearly contributing to the
52
Letter from Harlan Hochstetlcr, MCC Haiti Director to Art
Driedger, Acting Director for Latin America, February 5, 1970.
53
Paul Derstine, "1975 Second and Third Quarterly Report," March-
August 51, 1975.
54
development process. It must be noted that plastic pipe was not the I
oi material donated through the material aid program, but had to be pur-
chased. It is listed under the "purchased goods" category in Tabic 4.
In some part, change in the attitude toward and use of material aid
in Haiti during 15 years resulted not only from differing viewpoints of
directors and staff plus changing needs, but rather reflected MCC's overall
evolving views on the use of material aid and development. Merrill Fwert
notes:
It seems to me that the history of the Grande Riviere
program reflects the evolution of MCC's development thinking.
Beginning with institutions, structures and material aid,
there has been a movement towards doing less for people and
more things w i th them. From hiring Haitian staff and
building with bricks and mortar MCC involvement in the
community has become a catalytic one. This shift has been
a gradual process resulting from our growing awareness of
the effects of our programs, and our new understandings of
what development is all about.
A similar change in attitude toward material aid and development
will be noted in Jordan and to some extent in India.
JORDAN'
MCC activity in Jordan, begun in 1950, was largely in response to
the needs of Palestine refugees. From 1950 to 1967 attention focused on
refugees on the West Bank with Hebron and East Jerusalem as bases of
program activity. Following the 1967 war, refugees on the Fast Bank were
the focus of attention, with Amman the primary base of operation. MCC
programs among the Arab population continued on the Israeli-occupied West
Bank but very little material aid was used in this program so it is not
Lwert, op. cit.
55
included in this study. Since the early 19 70s, the MCC Hast Bank program
has steadily shifted away from the Palestine refugees to rural economic
development services to the Jordanian population. Table 5 gives the
statistics of material aid used in Jordan for the 15 years.
The MCC program in Jordan cooperated more closely with government,
United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) and other voluntary agencies
than was true in India or Haiti. This was probably due to the relatively
small size of the country, the political nature of needs and the sudden
and massive requirements of aid. The MCC program in Jordan had fewer
connections with local Christian churches than in Haiti or India. This
also could explain the necessity for more coordination with government and
nongovernment agencies.
The Jordan program was punctuated with several crises — the initial
1948 war, the 1967 war, the 1970 civil disturbance between Jordanians and
Palestinians and the October war of 1975. Between these crisis points MCC
programs gradually wound down and the need to stay was questioned. In
1964 the MCC director wrote to headquarters as follows:
We remain convinced that the situation here can no
longer be categorized as an emergency, but must be con-
sidered as one of chronic need. One difficulty if this
evaluation is valid is to define what stance MCC ought
to take vis-a-vis chronic need. The limited ability of
the government to assume full responsibility for all
social services because of limited finances and lack of
trained personnel suggests that there is a place for a
partner role. 55
Because UNRWA assumed overall responsibility for Palestinian
refugees and provided for their minimal food, clothing and housing needs,
3
Letter from Herbert Swartz, MCC Jordan Director, to Wilbert Shenk,
MCC Administrator for the Middle East, June 5, 1964.
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the voluntary agencies saw their role as supplementary. The Jordanian
Ministry of Social Welfare and Labor (MSAL) , in cooperation with UNRWA,
regularly appealed to the voluntary agencies for supplemental resources.
These were often in the form of blankets, tents, funds for temporary housing
construction, soap and specialized educational needs. Because of these
specific requests, blankets, clothing and soap were some of the most impor-
tant items sent to Jordan from MCC's material aid supplies. Limited quan-
tities of food were also shipped. The P.L. 480 flour distribution program
was an important part of the Jordan program from 1962 to 1967 and will be
reported on later in the study.
Like other voluntary agencies MCC responded to UNR'.v'A's requests as
it was able. For example, in 1965, UNRWA requested 1S7,591 pounds of used
clothing, which MCC agreed to provide. This amounted to 1.7 kgs. per
person for 85,000 refugees out of a total of 880,000 needy refugees. The
difference was made up by other voluntary agencies.
The 1971 Workbook reported:
A total of 116 tons of new and used clothing arrived
in Jordan during the year, valued at $255,000. Additional
supplies valued at $259,554 included blankets, quilts and
Christmas Bundles, layette bundles, new yard materials,
school supplies, sewing kits, soap and misc. supplies.
Nearly all clothing and blankets are distributed through
UNRWA and Ministry of Social Affairs channels. 56
1972 marked the end of general material aid distributions to
refugees. A November, 1972 letter from the director said:
As you already know this is the last year for our
material aid program. That is, we will discontinue
shipments of clothing, blankets, shoes and Christmas
bundles for children. Specific items will be requested
Mennonite Central Committee, "1971 Workbook."
38
only if they are used In connection with another
existing project. So we plan to continue Lmportin
kindergarten supplies, sewing kits, fabric ;md
layettes . •'
'
Distribution in Jordan for clothing and bedding followed several
patterns: (1) Most often bedding and sometimes soap were packed into f i
.
kilo bundles. MCC received instructions from UNRWA or the M5AL regarding
distribution. (2) Sometimes materials were turned over in bulk to UNRWA
or SISAL for distribution to designated refugees living in camps or
scattered among relatives in urban areas. (5) After 1973, as the amount
of material aid diminished, allocation was made to clinics, day care centers
and kindergartens operated by MCC, other agencies or by the government.
A project report by the MCC director in 1968 describes the unique
way of involving women, training them and distributing cloth:
In November, 1967 we opened a one-room layette center
at the NECC clinic in Jabel Nadef giving expectant mothers
an opportunity to sew clothes for their babies. Between
2 and 40 women come to sew each week. Each mother is
given precut items consisting of 2 diapers, 1 blanket,
2 dresses, 2 sacques, a bib and a band. All sewing is
done by hand, taking 2 days to complete. When the baby
arrives and birth certificate is shown the mother is
presented with a layette she made and one made up in the
United States. 58
P.L. 480 Program in Jordan
From 1962 until 1967 MCC Jordan administered a P.L. 480 program
consisting of flour distributions to indigent people on the East Bank of
Letter from Urbane Peachy, MCC Director in Jordan to Inter-
Mennonite Organization, November 14, 1972.
Virgil Claassen, "Project Report," 1968.
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Jordan. Approximately 14 million pounds of flour were distributed in tins
six-year period.
The purposes of the P.L. 4S0 flour distribution program as stated
in the July 5, 1962 agreement between MCC and the Government of Jordan
were :
. . . to operate a food distribution program for
needy individuals, i.e. social welfare cases and frontier
villages, in the districts of Hebron, Jenin, N'ablus,
Irbid and Amman. -^ 9
Distribution took place from 12 centers in monthly or quarterly
rations with recipients selected by the MSAL. Reports of those years
indicate some dissatisfaction with MSAL's selection method or eligibility
levels. The 1965 Workbook notes:
We insist, with both UNRWA and the GOJ . . . that
in direct aid programs involving MCC clothing and US
surplus flour, we aim to serve only those social cases
who have been found to be in real need as a result of
proper investigation .60
A letter from the MCC person responsible for flour distribution
programs quoted an MSAL official reporting off the record that the list of
eligible recipients was only 60% accurate. The MCC person estimated only
A CO, 6145-6 accuracy.
The 1965, 1964 and 1965 Workbooks mentioned 14,000 recipients of
surplus. The 1965 report indicates 20 pounds per month as the ration for
each recipient. A terminal audit dated July 50, 1968 gives MCC good marks
3
Audit MCC PL 480 Title II Program, Jordan and Israeli-Occupied
West Bank Territory, Period July 1, 1965-July 18, 1967, AID Office of
Area Controller General, Athens Greece, July 50, 196S.
Mennonite Central Committee, "1965 Workbook."
Letter from David Ott to Vern Prcheim, MCC Administrator for
Africa and the Middle Last, December 19, 1966.
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for its part in the program: "It appears that the MCC, P.L. 480, Title II
food distribution : .1 in Jordan was operated during FY 1966 and 1
in accordance with AID regulations. A Similar audit tor the period
July 1, 1962 -June 30, 1965 , indicated MCC had met its responsibilities as
far as the P.L. 4S0 program was concerned.
Food- for- Work Discussion
During the years of the flour distribution program there was dis-
cussion about the possibility of MCC initiating a food- for-work program
using P.L. 480 commodities. Most of this initiative came from MCC, both
in Jordan and the Akron headquarters, though there was some encouragement
from USAID. A 1966 letter noted that USAID was planning changes in the
Title III program which would encourage voluntary agencies to redirect
their feeding programs to food- for-work. Yet MCC was uncertain about
USAID' s intentions, since they planned to reduce the portion of food
available to Jordan.
Three more significant factors in MCC's decision on whether or not
to engage in food for work were (1) additional resources in personnel and
money required, (2) lack of promising projects to be undertaken and
(5) overall shortage of laborers for such projects.
f\7
Audit Report on P.L. 480 Title II, Pood Commodi ties , Mennonitc
Central Committee, for Period July 1, 1962-June 50, 1965, USAID Mission
to Jordan, January 31, 1965.
63
Ibid.
64„Ott Letter, op. cit.
65
Ibid.
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["he need for more finances to administer a workable food-for-work
program was noted by both field and home offices. A negative decision on
the question was partial 1>- indicated by instructions to reduce the budget
for the following year (1-7 1967).
Lack of good projects, a constraint in developing a food-for-work
program resulted when the Jordanian government took over the building of
roads and schools, projects which had been done with food-for-work by
other voluntary agencies. The third reason noted for not initiating food-
for-work programs, the difficulty in securing adequate numbers of laborers,
called into question the need for such employment.
In retrospect, it was difficult to utilize material aid in any
meaningful development program in Jordan. The Jordanian population, though
poor, was not particularly in need of food. There was no specific "pre-
harvest hunger" as found in many countries. The Palestine refugees had
their basic food needs met by UNRWA. Nonfood material aid items did not
lend themselves well to work-type projects. Yard goods and several MCC-
supplied kits were useable in vocational training activities but these
projects required only small amounts. What was needed before meaningful
development could take place among Palestinian refugees was a political
settlement.
INDIA
MCC relief activities in India began in 1942 in connection with
the work of Mcnnonite missionaries. Relief assistance was given to meet
needs resulting from the Bengal Famine of 1943 and the Partition of
India/Pakistan. A Lncd presence began Ln the early 1960s. Calcutta
and the surrounding area became the base of operation.
Though the
j
I Calcutta base, assistance is provided
through numerous church and government-related hospitals, clinics, schools
and day care centers throughout the area. Aid was provided in response to
disasters in various parts of India. Because of the size and population of
the country and the marginal level of existence of many people, disaster
assistance has almost been an annual occurrence. Droughts and floods occur
with predictable frequency.
Of the many disasters, two merited special response and will
receive special focus in this study: drought in 1966-68 in Bihar State and
the general food shortage in 1974-75. The latter resulted from drought
and floods throughout South Asia and from the worldwide food shortage and
higher prices of the period. Shortages were particularly acute in Madhya
Pradesh and Bihar State, two areas where Mennonite missions and churches
are located.
Proportionally, material aid lias been a more significant input in
the India program than in most other MCC programs. Disasters necessitated
immediate response with food and clothing. There were many mission-
operated institutions such as hospitals and schools through which material
aid could be funnclcd; and material aid could be shipped to and within
India with relative ease. Docking facilities, warehousing, customs, rail
and truck transport all provided impediments in the handling process, but
J ohn D . Un ruh , In the Name of Christ: A History of the Mennonite
Central Committee and Its Service 1920-1951 (Scottdale, Pa.: Herald Press,
1952), pp. 75 -SO.
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In contrast to Vietnam, Tchad or Indonesia, handling material aid was much
easier in India than in many other countries in which MCC worked.
Possibly a more important factor in MCC's focus on material aid in
contrast to community development or a more narrowly focused agricultural
development program was the difficulty of getting foreign personnel into
the country. A material aid program could be carried out by one foreign
staff person, given the existing institutions, while a rural development
program in the MCC style would have required a much larger foreign staff.
Table 6 gives data on the amount of material aid shipped to India
for the period 1962-76. Except for 1974-75, MCC drew on resources of
Church World Service/Lutheran World Relief (CWS/LWR) for P.L. 480 commo-
dities. This was particularly significant in the disaster response program
in Bihar in 1966-68. Since this resource was not available in 1974-75, MCC
shipped in substantial quantities of its own grain.
MCC's experience with material aid in India will be analyzed as
follows: (1) the regular distribution pattern followed during the 15-year
period, (2) response to the Bihar famine of 1966-68 and (5) MCC's response
to the 1974-75 food shortage.
Regular Distribution Pattern in India
Excluding the two famine periods, 1966-68 and 1974-75, 50 to 75
percent of the material aid was allocated to various institutions in India.
Little or no attempt was made by MCC to encourage or compel these institu-
tions to use the material aid in development -type activities. Material aid
was seen as complementing indigenous resources of these institutions.
Because of the variety and number of institutions served various
material aid items could be used effectively. Correspondence between MCC
44
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Akron and MCC Calcutta indicates that if MCC had an unusual or specialized
commodity available, India was a likely candidate to receive it. Raisins,
tomato paste, dried apples and honey were a few food items readily accepted
by the various institutions.
Medicines and soap were a significant portion of aid sent to India
in nonfamine periods, representing almost one-half the assistance sent
between 1969 and 1973. Some medicines were purchased by MCC, but most were
received as donations from American drug companies.
MCC did limit the scope of its institutional support program.
Opportunities and requests were almost limitless. Seven Mennonite missions,
related hospitals and selected institutions in the immediate Calcutta area
were the regular recipients of MCC aid. An attempt to limit the number of
receiving institutions was outlined in a visit of the MCC material aid
director to India in 1975. His report to the MCC Executive Committee said:
There is obviously a need for all kinds of material
aid supplies in the Calcutta area .... The question
is when and how much MCC should contribute? . . . We
agreed that for the next two years MCC Calcutta would
relate closely to five to seven institutions worthy of
help. We will give them supplies on a regular basis
with a termination date in mind. We believe this is
better than giving small amounts to 40 to 50 institutions
and have a limited relationship. We want material aid
help to have a long-term constructive effect on the
institution .6?
Reports seldom referred to the number of institutions receiving
help or the number of beneficiaries. The 1975 Workbook was an exception,
saying that material aid of all types was distributed to 55 different
John Hostetler, "Material Aid Report to the MCC Executive
Committee, December 11-12, 1975."
Institutions with a combined total of 14,500 beneficiaries.
MCC had a close fraternal relationship with CASA [Christian Agen
for Social Action), the relict" and service section of the National Council
of Churches of India. CASA provided clearances for all MCC shipments into
the country. Periodically shipments of food, bedding or soap were turned
over to CASA for distribution in Eastern India. Responses to small
disasters were always coordinated or cooperative ventures between the two
agencies
.
A major program activity during the 1960s and early 1970s was a
nutrition-health program among the East Bengal refugees living on the
outskirts of Calcutta. Milk from P.L. 4S0 via CWS/LWR was the main ingre-
dient in this feeding effort. Only young children, pregnant and nursing
mothers numbering approximately 1,200, were eligible recipients at the milk
kitchens. Commons urate with the feeding program was a poultry development
project. MCC assisted refugee families in establishing small laying flocks
and marketing eggs. Through this project an attempt was made to integrate
a child-feeding and development program.
MCC Calcutta office and staff were heavily involved in procurement
and shipping of supplies to East Pakistan following the devastating November,
1970 hurricane and tidal wave and the 1971 civil war. The bulge of material
aid activity in 1971 reflects that action. Only limited MCC help was
possible to the 10 million Bengalis who moved into India during the civil
war. The Indian government restricted the type and nature of assistance
which could be given. Most MCC effort during this period was to purchase
Mennonite Central Committee, 19 75 Workbook
.
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and transship materials from Calcutta to East Pakistan, later Bangladesh.
Although some unusual aid items were sent to India as described
earlier, overall MCC made a determined effort during the 15 years to send
only what was appropriate. MCC canned beef was not sent due to dietary
restrictions. Instead canned chicken was purchased as the primary protein
supply. Few clothes were sent. Instead saris and dhoties were purchased
within India for distribution following disasters. Not only were local
garments more appropriate, but usually they were cheaper. Fortunately
Eastern and Central Indians use some wheat in their diets. Rice is pre-
ferred, but wheat is acceptable. Consequently MCC could and did respond
with the commodity it had in greatest abundance --wheat. Some rice was
purchased in 1967 and 1974, but the quantities were small in comparison to
the amount of wheat used.
Response to Bihar Famine of 1966-68
The Bihar 1966-68 famine was considerably more severe than was the
1974-75 famine. Palamau District, the primary area of MCC concentration,
is a food deficit area in normal years. The years of serious or total crop
failure caused tremendous hardships on the local population. MCC's response
with food was larger in 1966-68 than it was in 1974-75, though cash expen-
ditures were less. Statistics on total grain used arc not available but
the 1969 Workbook reports that 5,000,000 pounds of wheat, 1,500,000 pounds
of milo, 200,000 pounds of cooking oil, 7,000 pounds of rice and 8,200
pounds of rai Ik were used. While some of this food was used in direct
feeding programs, the majority was used in food-for-work projects.
69
Mennonite Central Committee, 1969 Workbook,
.Like the amount of material and cash used, there i no comp:
hensive report of accomplishments. The following data on activities is
avai lab le:
In 1967:
-130,00t) children involved in daily school feeding progr I
-75 miles of road constructed
-74 large diameter wells dug
-8 water storage tanks built
-1 road bridge built /
In the period March 1968 - July 1909:
-257 larger diameter wells
-23 dams
-14 miles of road
-5 schools?!
In contrast to 1974-75 famine relief, it was easier for MCC to get
clearance for expatriate personnel to help supervise relief programs.
Usually three MCC-supported persons were in Bihar in addition to as many
longer-term missionaries who were able to give part-time help. Handling
grain took more personnel, both expatriate and local, than cash payments.
The project director in Bihar wrote:
During the month of June, (1968) we had an average
of 14,500 labourers working on the above projects each
day. To cope with the supervision and maintenance of
proper records we have hired a staff of 50 national men. ^
The staff reported numerous difficulties in project selection and
implementation. The location of wells was a particularly vexing problem.
Who would benefit from the well? Larger landowners only? Could wells be
A. C. Lobe, "Palamau District: Lethargic, Hungry," (Undated).
71
Mennonite Central Committee, 1969 Workbook.
72
A. C. Lobe, "Report of Bihar Agricultural Development Projects,"
Julv 7, 1968.
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located so Irrigation potential could be shared? Construction of dans
and holding tanks were also undertaken without sufficient planning and
engineering skill. There was some pressure from government to initiate
74bigger projects than would otherwise have been undertaken.
Substantially better records are available from the Bihar 1966-68
famine than from the one seven years later. Appendix A is a sample weekly
report to the government of food-for-work projects. The data seems to
indicate that the government took a much stronger role in coordinating the
work of voluntary agencies in 1966-68 than it did in 1974-75. This could
have been due to the greater severity of the famine. Better records on
MCC's part may reflect the use of P.L. 480 commodities and thus a greater
need to keep records
.
The Bihar famine of 1966-68 received some post-mortem analysis by
Alan Berg, internationally known nutritionist and US Drought Relief Opera-
tions Coordinator in India (1966-67). His analysis, published in Famine :
A Symposium Dealing with Nutrition and Relief Operations in Times of
Disaster
,
provides insights on the role and performance of the voluntary
,.
75
agencies in responding to such a massive disaster.
Berg notes the success of the famine response by saying, "... the
recent India crisis constitutes the first time in modern history that a
government declared war on large-scale famine--and won."
A. C. Lobe, "Mennonite Relief Committee: What? Who? Why? Where?
(Undated)
.
74
A. C. Lobe, "Palamau District: Lethargic, Hungry," op. cit.
75 n , .Blix, op. cit.
Berg, op. cit., p. 11 j.
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The presence of many voluntary agencies with broad experience in
[ndia and famine relief were major assets according to Berg. Their large
work p: served several useful purposes: They provided food or pur-
chasing power for thousands of destitute persons as well as accomplishing
worthwhile development projects; The work programs of the voluntary
agencies and of the government served to stem migrations from the famine
77
area, a serious problem in previous famines in India.
Berg notes that famine demands food. The need in some famines for
water is equally great. This was true in Bihar. Government and private
agency response to this need was effective with numerous schemes for
78
construction of wells and transport of water.
Berg details the massive size of the relief effort. He says:
In 1966-67, more than 20 million tons of food grain
were moved into drought effected areas of India, much of
this from abroad, but also much from elsewhere in India.
During the crisis, the Indian Government loaded and moved
an average of seven trains a day--50 cars per train--an
average of 550 miles. By the end of 1967, 155,000 fair
price shops were operating in the country (20,000 of them
in Bihar, the ration system benefiting 47 million Biharis)
and six million people were involved in relief projects
(700,000 in Bihar) . Programs for youngsters and destitutes
reached nearly 20 million (seven million in Bihar) during
the two years. The cost of all this: somewhere in the
vicinity of $700 million (perhaps $200 million of it spent
in Bihar). Help came from many foreign quarters, but the
major flow came from the United States which provided one-
fifth of its wheat crop. This constituted an unprecedented
movement of food from one country to another and required
an armada of some 600 ships. These docked at a rate of
three ships a day, depositing an average of 2 billion pounds
a month. Lester Brown estimates an equivalent of 60 million
Indians were sustained for two years solely by these ship-
ments . 79
77 79.
Ibid., p. 117 °Ibid., p. US
70/J
Ibid., p. 121.
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Response to the 1971-75 Food Shortage
Indian crops in 1 CJ 72 and 1975 were below average, particularly in
Bihar. MCC responded with additional cash appropriations. Most of these
funds were used in cash-for-work projects (workers paid in cash rather than
foodj . $10,000 of the appropriation was used to purchase rice in Thailand.
But as the food crisis gathered international attention, the number of
letters, reports and visits to the area accelerated. Budgets were pro-
jected upwards ever\r several months. The critical nature of the food
shortage was strongly perceived in India. The MCC director wrote in August
1975: "With reports coming from various parts of the world of similar food
SO
'shortages' one almost begins to get a feeling of panic."
In contrast to the 1966-68 famine MCC received no P.L. 4S0 grains
via CWS/LWR. P.L. 480 commodities were extremely tight. Consequently,
CWS/LWR were hardly able to supply CASA requirements. As a result MCC had
to supply its own grains. In late 1975 and early 1974 three shipments of
wheat were sent to India totaling approximately 1,000 tons. Of this amount,
40"o was donated by farmers in the midwest and 60 o6 purchased by MCC. Wheat
was allocated to two areas in Madhya Pradesh where Mcnnonite mission and
church relief committees supervised food-for-work projects; to Bihar where
the Mcnnonite Service Agency (MSA) directed similar projects; to CASA for
relief programs in Orissa; and to Calcutta where MCC allocated the wheat
to feeding programs operated by other organizations. In none of these
areas was MCC solely responsible for the food-for-work projects.
Letter from Neil Janzen, MCC India Director to Robert W. Miller,
MCC Administrator for Asia, August 21, 1975.
Throughout this crisis period, MCC sought to initiate long-ran
development programs rather than concentrate entirely on emergency rcli
a philosophy with growing emphasis in the 70s. This was ^lonc not only u
the work projects but also with budget allocations for India which included
monies for agricultural development. TELARC (The Hconomic Life and Relief
Committee] and MADRA (Mennonite Agricultural Development and Relief
Committee), similar to MSA, were started in Madhya Pradesh and received
grants from MCC for development activity. After much effort, MCC was able
to get a visa for a trained agriculturalist to assist these three associa-
tions in agricultural development projects.
One major exception to this integration of emergency relief and
development was a large child feeding program planned for Calcutta in 1974.
MCC initiated discussions with a consortium of agencies to supply food
(largely wheat) for a feeding program which was to reach a maximum of
40,000 recipients. Plans were to incorporate a strong nutritional/health
component into the program. MCC made the program contingent upon securing
a visa for a person to provide leadership. The program was dropped when
the visa was not forthcoming and when the group of agencies in Calcutta
lost interest. Improved crop prospects within India as the discussions
dragged on also seemed to indicate that the program was ill-conceived or
ill-timed.
During 1974-75 and to a lesser extent in 1966-68, sharp debate took
place concerning the desirability of using "cash" or "food" in the work
programs. In 1966-68 this debate was not as acute since food was readily
available from P.L. 4S0 stocks at no cost. MCC cash was also more
restricted in 1966-68 than it was in 1974-75.
OJ
Letters and reports from India indicate several ingredients in the
debate
:
1. Cost was a factor. If wheat had to be purchased in North
America and shipped to India, the overall cost would be
greater than if cash was paid to the workers. 81
2. Food imports add to the total supply. Cash given forces
up the price of food in a short-supply situation. 82
5. Food was less likely to be diverted by the recipients to
nonessentials than was cash. The MCC director reported,
"Government officials contacted estimate that anywhere
from 50 to 70 percent of the workers' wages will be misused
in this way (consumed on alcohol) ."8-5
4. There was mixed feeling and opinion on whether diversion is
greater in food-for-work or cash-for-work projects.
"Actually working with cash is much easier, faster and more
efficient . . . than working with wheat," the director
wrote in 1975.84
But the head of the CIVS office in New Delhi wrote to the
CASA director in Calcutta as follows: "As you know, it is
extremely difficult to control food and materials. It is
far more difficult to control money. The chances for
leakage and misuse are vastly increased. "8^
The above factors were taken into account in deciding which method
of payment to use in a given situation. But sometimes the lack of available
food shipments predisposed a decision toward cash. Sometimes both methods
of payment were used at the same time.
Neil Janzcn, letter to John ilostetler, MCC Material Aid Director,
October 21, 1975.
Neil Janzcn, letter to Robert W. Miller, May 5, 1974.
83
Neil Janzcn, "Report, Drought: Palamau District, Bihar,"
November, 19 72.
Q 1
'Neil Janzcn, letter to Gayle Gerber Koontz, MCC Information
Secretary, April 50, 1975.
o c
Thomas Hemphill, CIVS New Delhi, letter to P . C. Joseph, CASA
Director, Calcutta, April 24, 1975.
.It is [impossible to totally measure the deve l ifit ol any
given work project. Dams built, roads construct'.".! or wells dug arc ot" no
development consequence unless they are used and maintained. MCC records
do give some positive indicators on work projects. The 1974, 1975 and 19 70
Workbooks report completed projects being utilized for greater food pro-
duction. The 1975 Workbook reports of one project area alone: "Up to 400
acres of land will come under cropping due to the presence of dams. Perhaps
three times that acreage will receive supplemental irrigation from the dams
during the rainy season."
Dr. Leonard Siemens, MCC (Canada) Member and Dean of the College of
Agriculture of the University of Manitoba, and Edgar Stoesz, MCC staff
member, visited India in September 1975 and made the following observation
on the benefits of work projects in Central India and Bihar:
A rough cost-benefit calculation indicates that the
dam work paid for with one bag of wheat made possible new
food production in the first year of from 5-6 bags
depending on the level of natural rainfall. 87
A further factor contributing to development potential of MCC-
initiated work projects was the fact that often MCC development programs
paralleled the cash-for-work or food-for-work projects in a given community.
This continued through MSA in Bihar and TELARC and MADRA in Madhya Pradesh.
Seeds, fertilizer, credit, technical help and specialized equipment were
available from these development-oriented agencies.
The key to good projects was good planning. Records do not show
any manual or standard-opcrating-proccdures on how to set up projects.
Q C
Mennonite Central Committee, 1975 Workbook.
Leonard Siemens , Edgar Stoesz, "India Trip Report," September 11-19,
1975.
io
There is evidence that instructions were given by the MCC director to
project leaders at the time of his on-site visits, and several letters list
the following brief criteria for selection of projects:
1. Community Involvement. The basic idea of these relief
projects is to provide interim employment. Therefore
a project should attempt to employ as many people as
possible.
2. Execution of the Project . The project must be one that
can be properly carried out and where ever necessary
the advice of qualified persons such as engineers
should be sought after.
5. Usefulness to the community . The project should not be
one that merely gives people work in doing something
that has no lasting benefit. Thus the end product
whether it be a well or irrigation canal should bene-
fit a community or small group of people but not
merely one or two individuals or a family. ^"
88
Neil Janzen, Memo to Ben Sawatzky, January 30, 1975.
CHAPTER 4
DATA ANALYSIS
lortance of Material Aid
la order to try to ascertain the importance of material aid con-
tributions to MCC's supporting constituency, a question was submitted to
seventeen persons who are involved in some way in MCC's fund raising
efforts. Most of these persons also have some responsibility for inter-
preting material aid needs. About one-half of the respondents serve as
directors of MCC regional offices.
The question asked (Appendix B) was this: In the event of a radical
reduction of material aid used, would MCC receive the equivalent monies as
cash donations? Would MCC get its current cash donation of 6 million
dollars and an additional 5 million dollars or a part of it now represented
by the material aid contribution?
The response was as follows:
1. Would MCC get its current $6 million and an extra $3 million
that now comes in the form of material aid?
2. 8 Would MCC get the $6 million and about one-half the material
aid value, $1.5 million?
3.
_
Would MCC get only the $6 million?
4.
_2 Would MCC get less than the $6 million?
Clearly, material aid plays a veiy important role in the minds and
actions of MCC's supporting constituency. One respondent commented:
To radically eliminate or reduce the program I think
would cause our constituency to lose confidence in MCC and
would create confusion and uncertainty since the media
56
57
would continue to remind us that there still are hungry
people around the world. Eliminate relief (material aid)
and 1 feel in the minds of many constituents you have
closed the door on MCC. As long as we continue to do
relief, they will support us in our other endeavors, e.g.
development.
™
Another respondent indicated that if MCC requests for material aid
were radically reduced, cash contributions would fall. He said:
. . . other organizations are actively pursuing relief
programs that emphasize material aid; these siphon off
material aid from our regular constituency, and cash dona-
tions tend to follow. 90
The importance of linking some cash contributions to material aid-
type purchases was emphasized by several persons. One said:
It (material aid) could be purchased in North America
by MCC or even purchased in the receiving country as long
as the constituents would know that a certain portion of
their contributed dollars would be used for purchasing of
material aid to be distributed to the needy. 91
Several respondents emphasized the importance of adequate inter-
pretation of any reduction in requests for material aid. They felt that
with proper management the fall -off in contributions need not occur. The
director of the Lancaster, Pennsylvania Area Relief Committee noted how
cash contributions had actually been increased when it was no longer
possible for volunteers to can meat for relief. He said:
We told our story and asked for cash instead of
donated animals. The cash received enabled purchase of
similar volume .... Cash for food for relief con-
tinues to eniov an increasing response over the past
ten years. Jl-
89
Reg Tocws, Memo to author, February 2 5, 19 7S.
90
Vern Ratzlaff, Letter to author, February 7, 197
91
Arthur Driedger, Note to author, March 10, 197S.
92
Norman Shenk, Note to author, February 2, 1978.
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Another person pointed to actual giving Stati ' in his area.
noted that from L968-197S material aid contribution:; went down while cash
contributions went up even after allowance was made for inflation. Tins, he
noted, would indicate that contributions need not drop off if material aid
requests are reduced.
All respondents from Western Canada, except one, checked numbers
three or four among the options. They believe the constituency in this
region wants to continue contributing material aid items. This may be due
to the fact that most of these persons were helped themselves by MCC's food
and clothing contributions to Russia in the 1920s and Western Europe in the
1940s.
Clearly, MCC will need to give vigorous attention to interpreting
the reasons for reductions in material aid requests if cash contributions
are not to be lost. With proper interpretation, substantial loss in overall
income is not automatic, except possibly in Western Canada. But the link
between total cash contributions and material aid contributions must be
recognized for the present. Material aid contributions will continue to
be an important resource for MCC, not only for value per se, but for its
relationship with contributions of cash.
Questionnaire Responses
Fifteen questionnaires were sent to persons who had been responsible
for MCC's material aid programs and other development activity in Haiti,
Jordan and India. (See complete questionnaire in Appendix C) . Most of
these persons served as country directors. Twelve questionnaires were
95
Ooug Snyder, Letter to author, (undated)
59
returned. Of five questionnaires sent to persons involved in programs of
each of the three countries, one person from each country failed to respond.
The questionnaire was not designed to measure attitudes and program
achievements in a scientific way. It was rather an attempt to survey atti-
tudes and perceptions of those MCC persons who were intimately involved in
the use of material aid during their period of service. It served as a
source of supplemental data to that found in the MCC records. Most of the
respondents had served three-year assignments in the respective countries.
Responses reflect not only the individual's own perspective on development
and material aid's contribution to it, but also conditions pertaining to
respective countries and time of service.
The following is a tabulation of responses. Most questions indicate
responses from the three countries separately. Some questions required
sentence responses. Some of these are reported. An analysis of responses
is made after each question.
1 . What percentage of material aid was distributed in a given year directly
under MCC's responsibility, and what percentage through second parties
,
e.g., government, churches ?
Haiti: The first three directors to serve in Haiti listed 90-100"j
under MCC responsibility; the last, or most recent, listed
i r 1 'Zj o .
Jordan: The respondents, listed in chronological order as they served
in Jordan, indicated 100, 90, 25, and 20"o distributed under
MCC responsibility.
India: Here second parties were responsible for the majority of
materials; 60, 95, 85 and 100°6. (Chronological order does
not apply for the last two respondents because of personnel
overlapping in periods of service and locations)
.
Overall there seems to be a shift from MCC taking primary responsibility for
distribution, to that of working through other agencies.
00
2 . Indicate the percentage of material aid Ji ; t ributed through the fol 1 r.vi ng
channels :
Hal ti Jordan India
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 1st 2nd 3rd 4th
'6 institutions 50 45 90 100 15 8 10 10 50 40 SS 10
"o food-for-work 25 45 5 5 2 55 45 15 87
°o direct hand out 25 10 80 90 90 10 15 15 2
% other 5 80 1
3. Indicate the percentage of material aid distributed to meet the follow -
ing needs :
Haiti Jordan I ndia
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 1st 2nd 3rd 4th
°
emergency relief 5 100 20 80 25 10 25 8
% development 10 45 60 5 25 45 80
% endemic needs 10 10 80 70 10 10 10 2
°o institutional 75 45 40 100 15 10 50 50 65 10
% other 10 5
Questions 2 and 3 were quite similar and responses reflected that similarity,
There was no unanimity of opinion as to what constitutes use of material aid
for emergency relief or endemic needs, particularly in Jordan. Tue bulk of
relief supplies were distributed in cajiips or to refugees scattered among
relatives in urban areas. Hither designation would seem appropriate to
describe the needs of these refugees.
4. What staff person in vour program had primary responsibility for the
material aid program ?
No one uniform pattern was evident in all three countries. In Haiti, the
MCC director or expatriate staff person had responsibility. In Jordan and
India a national staff person had primary responsibility.
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5. Of the material aid distributed In youi' program, approximate ly what
percentage was purchased locally : 0%, 25%, 50°j or
75%? The number of MCC directors from each country responded as
to 1 lows
:
Haiti Jordan India
(ft 5 2 2
25° 1 2 2
50°6
75°o
Only a very small percentage of the material aid was purchased locally in
any of the countries. Several persons who checked "25%" noted that it was
actually less than this.
6. Who made the primary decision as to where your material aid was
distributed ?
All respondents indicated that the MCC director made the primary decision
on material aid allocations. Several noted that this was done in consul-
tation with local government or churches. In Jordan this consultation was
with UNRWA.
7. Regarding the economic level of the population the material aid program
was directed to the :
Haiti Jordan I n d i a
lowest 10"o 1 2 1
lowest 25"u 2 5
lowest 50"o 5
Responses to this question were somewhat surprising, particularly from
Haiti. One would have expected a greater portion to be directed to the
neediest portion of the population. Since much oi' the material aid '•
allocated to the hospital/clinic, this could explain the response from
Haiti.
S. Material aid was easier
,
about the same
,
more difficult
to administer following a disaster than in response to a situation of
endemic novertv?
-
*
—
Haiti Jordan India
easier 1 2
about the same 1 1
more difficult 15 1
onses reflect experiences the different directors had in supervising
material aid programs. Two responses from Haiti indicate that they did
not participate in disaster programs. One respondent said: "The endemic
situation was easier because channels were there for distribution. Within
myself the struggle was more difficult because of the dehumani -ing effect
long-term distributions had on people."
9 . Did you have adequate
,
less than adequate instructions from
MCC (Akron office) in setting goals for the material aid program?
Haiti Jordan India
adequate 5 3 5
less than adequate 111
Interestingly, the directors who indicated that they had "less than adequate"
instructions all served from about 1975 to 1976. This probably resulted
from the tremendous emphasis MCC placed on development programs during this
period. At the MCC Annual Meeting in 1974, a resolution on world hunger
was passed calling for priority to development during the next five to ten
years. No mention was made in the resolution to food aid.
65
1 . List several economic and programmatic/admini strati vo factors used to
determine whether or not a material aid program should he initiated :
Lconomic
-need; food shortages, floods, famines, refugees, etc.
-would material aid items neutralize local production
-if receiving institution could extend its services with
this additional support
-expressed community need and participation
-long-term economic effect on recipients
Programmatic/ administrative
-available resources; budget, materials, staff time
-had organizational know-how
-national emphasis on development
-following feasibility study
-degree of control over distribution
-suitability of available material aid to meeting objectives
-cost of shipping, freight and time involved
-factors of developing dependency on goods
11. Among these items which have most often been available in the MCC
material aid program, which were most useful in meeting emergency
,
development and endemic poverty needs ?
Responses to this question were interesting though very difficult to
quantify. The majority of respondents simply checked several items that
were most useful. Little attempt was made to rank the different items.
In India, wheat and milk received a uniformly high rating for use in all
three situations. Blankets and soap were indicated as suitable items for
emergency and endemic poverty situations. The suitability of blankets for
response to emergencies and endemic poverty needs was the only point of
agreement in the Jordan responses. There was surprising disagreement in
other categories. Clearly, there is no unanimity of opinion among personnel
who served in one country, let alone among those from several countries on
what material aid items are most useful for given situations. This might
o4
Kelp to explain why it has been necessary to provide so many different types
ot* Items in the MCC material aid program.
1 2 . hist several factors which were most significant in making the mat'.- :
aid pro; ran successful in your country :
-government cooperation
-high quality ot MCC materials
-clear, identifiable needs
-good coordination with other voluntary agencies
-good organization for distribution
-careful advance planning
-clear policy on allocations
-good infrastructure that allowed material aid to be part of
resource input
-ability to use it in food-for-work programs
-the fact that it was not the primary program input added to
the success
-(two respondents commented that mass distributions of material
aid could not be considered successful under any terms of
reference)
15. Did vou feel the Akron administrator responsible for vour countrv
I , ,—, * 1 c—
gave more
,
less , or about the same amount of care and
attention to the material aid program as he gave to other aspects of
the program?
Haiti Jordan India
more
less 3 2 1
about the same 12 2
The responses to this question may help to explain why some directors
experienced difficulty in utilizing the material aid resource that was
available to them.
1 4 . If applicable, list ways in which nonfood items were used in devclop -
ment urograms:
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-health kits, sowing kits and yard goods to home economics
programs in rural schools
-blankets and sheets used as "prizes" to encourage rural women
to construct latrines and sanitary outdoor kitchens
-plastic pipe used in capping springs
-soap was used in conjunction with food-for-work
-blankets for work projects following cyclones
-yard goods provided for village sewing centers
One person said, "Material aid was used more in earlier years in food-for-
work projects, but it was my view that after 20 years of basically relief
mentality, material aid had to be removed entirely from development
program."
15. Did you feel that you had on your staff the necessary skills to
administer a material aid program effectively?
All but one respondent indicated that they had the necessary skills.
16. Did vou feel that vou or those on vour staff responsible for the
. . < <—
1
< i
,
.—
i
material aid program had the necessary time to adequately administer
the material aid program?
All but one person answered "yes" to this question. The negative respon-
dent said that much more case work was required.
17. Did your material aid program contribute
,
detract from
,
or
__
bave a neutral effect upon your other development activity ?
(Tabulation of responses after question 18)
.
18. If "contribute toward" or "detract from" was checked in the above
question, please indicate how or why this was true .
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llai 1
1
.Jordan I ruli a
contribute 1 - 1 2
detract from 1 2 1
neutral effect upon 1 1
5o:r.e positive responses: "It served as a reward and encouragement factor
in the total process;" and "Food was available for well digging, dam
building, irrigation work where funds would not have been. Hence projects
were much larger."
Some negative responses were:
I say detract, because the handling of material aid,
at times because of obligation to 'keep it coming, 1 tended
to divert our attention from the problem being addressed.
Thus we could easily become preoccupied with the means and
forget the end.
Why work when others were receiving it free?
The importation of goods is a major distraction from
the self help process. It for one tells the nationals
they are failures that their own materials are of less
quality .... Seldom do those who really need assis-
tance get it.
19 . In what ways, if any, was food used for development purposes other
than in food- for-work projects ?
None were mentioned.
2 . In your opinion who determined the size of MCC 's material aid program ?
Although several persons checked two or three different options, all but
one indicated that "need for material aid as perceived by the country
director or other responsible field staff" determined the size.
21. If the dollar value of all the material aid that was available to you
would have been sent to you as cash in addition to the regular budget
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in a given year, what percent would you have spent for material aid?
* - -
Responses to this question were so varied that one can only conclude that
the question was misunderstood or poorly phrased.
22 . The following question pertains specifically to the portion of material
aid used in development activity: If the value of that material aid
had been available in cash, would the accomplishments have been
greater, about the same, or less than what was accom-
plished with the material aid ?
Haiti Jordan India
greater 114
about the same 1
less 3 1
The directors in India would have preferred cash and in Haiti there was
preference for material aid. The responses might reflect the fact that
some of the items imported into Haiti could not be purchased there. One
person from Jordan wrote, "We could have done much more effective work
before and during my time had we had cash resources for a flexible approach
to material aid. Response was too much predicated on the available givens
from our constituency and warehouse stocks."
23. Were vou encouraged bv the Akron office to use material aid in develon-
t . _^ £-, . .—.—.—
,
„—.—. , 1 , — *—
ment activities ?
All responded positively except one person.
24. Did you receive a great deal of , some , little , or
no satisfaction from administering the material aid aspect of
your program ?
llai ti Jordan Indi a
a great deal oi 2 1 1
some 12 1
little l 2
no 1
The persons who were responsible for programs in the l'JGOs checked "great
deal of or "some" whereas the persons who carried program responsibility
in the 1970s tended to check "little" or "no" satisfaction.
25
.
What factors, if any, prevented you from using a greater percentage
of material aid for development?
-lack of staff, time, budget
-fear of developing dependency
-tendency of recipients to view aid as "hand outs" only
-lack of local organization
-long-term development objectives difficult to achieve vis a vis
aid-in-kind
-food was locally available
-resale of material aid was common
26. As vou reflect on MCC ' s total world-wide material aid urogram, describe
its objective in a sentence or two .
A surprising number of respondents defined the objective in terms of North
America's need to give of their surplus. The other definitions emphasized
response to emergencies and resources for development.
27. Among the following, check the statements which most clearly reflect
your attitude toward MCC ' s material aid program : (See list of options
in Appendix)
.
There was no unanimity of response to this question. Several respondents
checked more than one option. All items were checked at least once though
number 2, "The material aid program should be discontinued except for
emergency disaster-type situations," received the most responses.
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28 and 2D. Responses to these two questions on food-for-work project
administration were too few to indicate any preferences.
30. List your major difficulties related to food-for-work programs :
-funding needed for skilled labor
-spoilage of food, storage
-sale of food by workers
-getting food on time
-selection of good projects
-relating "need" to work
51. What type of food-for-work activity provided the best development
results ?
All the projects listed were checked at least once.
CHAPTER 5
OBSERVATIONS, I -"IN DINGS AND RECOM4ENDATION
This part of the study attempts to refine the MCC experience in
Haiti, India and Jordan for specific applicability to future programs.
Some suggestions and guidelines emerge from the literature review chapter
as well. Findings will have specific applicability for MCC but hopefully
will also have some relevance for other development agencies, large or
small. Some findings appear self-evident and hardly seem to bear men-
tioning, but reference to some which seem obvious should be evidence that
they are too often overlooked. Findings focus particularly on the develop-
ment aspect of material aid use.
It should be noted that beginning in late 1976, MCC has been giving
attention to deficiencies in its material aid and disaster response program.
Material aid/disaster coordinators have been assigned to India/Bangladesh,
the Sahel region of Africa and the MCC headquarters offices. A policy
statement on the role of material aid was approved at the most recent MCC
Annual Meeting [Exhibit D) . In India and Bangladesh, the material aid/
disaster coordinator along with MCC country directors arc giving concerted
attention to formulating program goals and procedures for material aid
programs
.
The following is a summary of learnings:
1. Results from the brief questionnaire submitted to 17 fund
raising-related persons offer some insights on MCC's available resources.
One can conclude that MCC's ability and willingness to respond to emergency
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relict needs may be more important to the supporting constituency than
whether or not material aid is used. The supporting constituency wants to
see a certain portion of contributions used to meet immediate and basic
needs of people. There is not as much concern as to how needs are met,
whether with material aid or cash. It would be easier to discontinue
material aid assistance than to stop responding to disasters with emergency
relief, whatever form that relief takes.
2. MCC records and questionnaire responses are almost uniformly
agreed that material aid has a legitimate place in emergency relief programs
There is no agreement on its legitimacy for assisting the development
process
.
3. Disasters, particularly famine periods, can be an opportunity
for development. Contributing factors may be: (a) Receptivity of people
to new methods of cultivation, (b) New seeds can be introduced since old
ones are consumed, (c) Increased attention to and urgency of agricultural
development on the part of farmers and government, (d) Added resources
available both from within the country and from outside, e.g. credit,
technical advice, (e) Reduced bureaucratic constraints and (f) Increased
prices of farm products.
The difficulty of getting viable development programs going in
Haiti may be related to the above. Haiti lias experienced chronic poverty
and repeated small disasters but has never had to declare "war on famine"
as India had to in 1966-68 and 1974-75.
4. Before 1976, MCC seldom had specific and clearly-stated goals
for material aid programs. This probably resulted from a lack of clearly-
.stated goals for the total program which has also rccoi ieen corrected.
rhe lack of clear l] and specific directions for materia] aid programs
also gives one the Impression that the Akron area administrators genera.,
gave less interest and time to material aid programs than to other parts
of the program. Without clear, specific goals it was difficult for local
Staff to measure accomplishments from year to year.
5. Reporting and records of material aid use lacks consistency
and regularity. Records on development accomplishments through the use of
material aid are also poor and inconsistent. Records from India's Bihar
famine of 1966-68 are the best from any country and any period studied, but
there regularity and content could have been improved with lainimal extra
effort. Clearer directions on record keeping and reporting on material
aid use should be issued by the Akron office, allowing for balance between
uniformity and individual country variation. Reports should include the
type and quantity of material aid used, destination and accomplishments
resulting from it. Categories such as long-range development, institu-
tional support and emergency relief should be developed.
6. Much of the material aid shipped to the three countries studied
(more than 50 percent most years in both India and Haiti) is allocated to
institutions. This study did not adequately probe the overall contribu-
tion made by this contribution to institutions.
There was no coherent philosophy or guidelines on why, when, and
what type of material aid to provide to institutions. Guidelines were
being developed in India in 19 76 but the records did not indicate such for
Haiti or Jordan for the period under study. Development of such a
/ J
statement should be done for the agency as a whole with each country able
to adapt i t to meet local peculiarities. This might allow for expansion
of material aid activity in some countries.
7. No definitive statement on what type of organization to work
through can be made for material aid distributions on the basis of the
three-country study. Cooperation with some churches, local governments
and village organizations was effective, with others it was ineffective.
Criteria other than the type of local cooperating body determines program
success
.
8. MCC country directors expressed differences on how they view the
role of material aid in the MCC program. But those differences were not as
varied as anticipated. Most of the differences reflected were related to
the time period of service (1960 vs. 1970s) rather than to differing views
of the directors themselves or the countries in which they served.
Generally directors in the 1960s felt better about material aid use and
distributed more than did their counterparts in the 1970s. This obser-
vation reflects an evolution in general thinking on development and MCC's
evolving program priorities more than the views of personnel involved.
More guidance to country directors on the role material aid can have in
the overall program, and specifically in development, would be helpful.
9. In an attempt to determine which material aid items contributed
most to development, no clear pattern emerged.
10. Nonfood items can make a positive contribution to development
programs but only in relatively small quantities. They are more useful
an J can be used in Larger quantities in emergency relief or institutional
support programs. Frequently nonfood Items can and should be bought within
the country where they are distributed.
11. MCC has a good record of sending quality and culturally-
appropriate items. Few complaints and many positive comments were noted.
In addition to good quality control within the constituency, MCC is willing
to purchase needed items in local countries when that is most appropriate.
12. MCC personnel administering material aid set a very high
standard for distribution. Consequent ly, when abuses occurred, as they
did, there was often a desire to discontinue the program. A greater
realism must be recognized when handling materials. One needs to strive
for the most efficient program possible, but recognize that some abuses
are inevitable.
15. At least in emergencies, relief for relief's sake is legiti-
mate. Relief may, but does not always have to lead to development. But
clearly defined objectives, target audiences and time schedule plus ade-
quate administration are as important in a strictly relief program as they
are in a development program.
14. MCC use of material aid for development purposes emerged from
the need to provide cash or food for immediate relief rather than from a
desire to accomplish some development objective. Drought, flood, preharvest
hunger or political unrest created the need. The development component of
these efforts has been secondary rather than a primary purpose. Work
projects were seen as a means to avoid hand outs.
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Given MCC's past history, size and program philosophy this emphasis
will likely continue. Food-for-work projects will be initiated in response
to food needs rather than as an attempt to accomplish a development
objective
.
15. Work projects are only successful in meeting a temporary
employment or food need such as preharvest hunger. They are not viable as
a solution to long-term unemployment or food shortage. Therefore, goals
and termination schedule are crucial and must be set from the beginning.
16. No one comprehensive set of ingredients can be identified for
establishing a successful food-for-work project, but the following are
usually required:
-identifiable purpose for the project
-cooperative local government
-careful advance planning and clear administrative procedures
-available supplemental resources such as skilled labor, cash,
transport, storage
-adequate, competent staff
17. No clear preference for cash-for-work or food-for-work projects
can be given without analyzing various factors. The following factors would
favor a food-for-work approach:
-overall shortage of food in the area or country
-goal of getting maximum amount of food to people
-availability of food from outside the country or from
another part of the country
-good transport and storage facilities for the food
-a culturally acceptable food available for payment
-adequate and competent personnel for transport and distribution
of the food
-preference stated by the government or the people themselves
-able to provide a more nutritious food than traditionally
eaten, e.g. corn -soya -mi Ik rather than corn meal
-limited cash available
-lengthy lead time (procurement and transport of grain to
project site may take six months or more)
-goal to reduce inflationary spiral on local food prices
l'ho following factors would favor a cash-for-work approach:
-adequate food locally ivailable
-primary goal is to case unemployment problem
-only food available is culturally unacceptable
- limited personnel resources
-funds not a limiting factor
-limited storage and transport facilities
-inadequate lead time
-little opportunity for spending funds on nonproductive,
non-essential consumption
-preference of government or workers themselves
-goal to avoid depressing local grain prices
Frequently it is possible and advantageous to use a combination of
both cash-for-work and food- for-work. This requires more administration
and record keeping but offers advantages from both approaches. Particu-
larly it can prevent the selling of food commodities for cash, a problem
that accompanies many food-for-work projects. The ratio of food to cash
payments can be varied according to local conditions.
18. Smaller food-for-work projects were usually more successful
than larger ones. More administration was required per grain input and
work output, but the success rate was higher. Before starting large work
projects, one should have successfully completed similar smaller ones.
19. Work projects should be community-based. They must serve a
defined group of persons, such as an entire or specific part of a community.
Difficulties resulted in India when wells served only one farmer.
20. Clear government coordination and cooperation is important in
any work program. The MCC work program in India experienced excellent
support and cooperation. Part of the success can be attributed to that.
Programs in Haiti suffered from lack of government cooperation. Undoubtedly
this was a contributing factor to MCC's unwillingness to initiate more work
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projects. Maintaining effective communications with government, both local
and national, can be most helpful when discussions related to disaster
response program must be initiated. One can anticipate greater government
interest and cooperation in disaster response programs than in other day-to-
day operations
.
21. Work projects should be a type which local communities or
governments cannot do on their own. They also should not be competitive
with local community or government projects. Real efforts should be made
to make such projects experimental or innovative. If successful, local
governments or communities can multiply the projects in size and scope.
One reason MCC Jordan did not engage in more food-for-work projects was
that other agencies and the government were already building roads and
schools. MCC staff was at a loss to project more innovative projects.
22. When financial resources are a constraint, and if free or
low-cost food is available, food-for-work projects can contribute to added
development activity. But administrative costs are a factor and need to
be provided for. Food may be free, but converting it to food-for-work and
development will take cash which may range from 25"o to 100°o of the value
of the food.
23. No clear consensus emerges on whether work projects are best
located in conjunction with or apart from other development efforts. The
majority of evidence appears to come down on the side of linking the two
efforts. The ability to maximize production efforts seems to outweigh the
"make work" factor.
When development rather than employment is the p try considera-
tion work projects are most effective when initiated Ln conjunction with
other development activity. Other development programs, particularly
extensi type programs, can help to insure that benefits accrued from the
work projects are maximized.
2\. Work projects designed to meet temporary unemployment or a
food deficit situation may naturally lead to a development program. This
was particularly true in MCC's Bihar program in 1966-68.
25. Before initiating a work project it is essential to have
assured other inputs besides food and cash such as technical-engineering
expertise, government clearances, and all material supplies (cement, steel,
stone, wood, etc.) before proceeding. Frequently these other resources
should be solicited from the local community or government.
s26. Related to the above and probably even more important, it i
essential to determine before the project is begun how benefits from it
are to be distributed or utilized. Untold problems can result from not
determining in advance how the water from the dam or well will be distri-
buted, for example.
27. In planning for a work project, particular attention needs to
be given to legal and practical considerations governing land reclamation
and usage. What provisions arc there for providing compensation for the
landowners and tenants of land covered by a dam? What provision for com-
pensation is needed for land used to widen a road?
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28. Work projects should be planned with the seasonal work
schedule clearly in mind. Work activities on the project should not pull
laborers from planting, cultivating or harvesting their own crops. Such
planning usually identifies periods of maximum need for food or cash to
purchase food.
29. In planning work projects, attempt should be made to avoid
large migrations of workers. Where possible, projects should be located
near homes of potential laborers. Smaller projects help avoid importing
laborers from a distance. Scatter numerous projects rather than concen-
trating them in one area. This will reduce housing, transportation and
sanitation needs.
30. Payment for work projects, whether in food or cash, should be
high enough to attract workers but not too high that it draws them away
from regular employment. Frequently governments or other agencies will have
a prescribed formula which can be followed. Where several agencies are
working in a given area, care should be taken to pay equivalent wages.
31. Work projects begun in response to famine conditions need to
take into account the weakened condition of the population. Expectations,
rest periods, etc., need to consider the health of workers.
32. Work projects can be an effective way of reaching the lower
I0
n
6 (poorest of the poor) of the population. These persons are frequently
landless and have only seasonal employment if any employment at all.
55. Work projects lend themselves much better to i ira] than to
urban areas. MCC has had only Limited success in Initiating successful
work projects in urban areas.
54. Before initiating a work project, be sure the objectives to
be achieved are clearly stated. Is relief, development or employment the
primary objective? If several objectives are desired, which has priority?
The type of project and manner in which it is carried out should reflect
the objective(s)
.
55. Provision should be made for the maintenance of the end
product before the work project is begun. Just as it is an essential
development principle to have assured the operating expenses of an insti-
tution before it is launched, so maintenance and servicing cost of any
dam, well, road or school should be assured before it is constructed.
Summary
r—
The food shortages of 197-1-75 generated a new look at the role of
voluntary agencies in disaster response programs. In the last decade a
growing urgency to move from emergency food aid to long-range development
programs has emerged. This study of MCC's experiences in three countries
hopefully contributes to that discussion.
In MCC ' s experience, material aid was an important resource, but
played only a supporting role to other inputs in the countries studied.
Its contribution was made more effective by the other inputs. It is not
clear, however, to what degree material aid inputs contributed to other
longer-term development efforts.
The stud} - showed how MCC's use of food for development resulted
primarily from the need for food rather than from the desire to implement
a development objective. More attention should be given by MCC on how the
resource of food could be used to accomplish a development objective in
other than emergency situations. The experiences of other voluntary
agencies such as CARE, Church V.'orld Service and Catholic Relief Service
should be solicited in this regard.
Two areas of MCC's material aid program which merit further study
are: (1) factors which contribute to or prevent the development of depen-
dency on the part of material aid recipients and (2) criteria for deter-
mining when MCC should purchase local food or other material aid supplies,
rather than relying on imports.
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APPENDIX A
MENNONITE RELIEF COMMITTEE
AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
Satbarwa P. 0. Palmau Disc
Bihar
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District Commissioner
Daltongunj P. 0.
District. Palamau
Binar State.
18th April, 1968
Ref: Reports on Community Development Projects
undertaken by the Mennonite Relief Committee
during the month of March 1968.
Dear Sir:
Following are the details of ail projects undertaken by the Mennonite
Relief Committee: -
SI No. Center Daily Daily P R J E C T S
Workers Benefits Well s Bandhs Road
1. Latehar Block 1084 6155 41 None One
2. Manika Block 2589 13009 51 8
3. Chandwa Block 1162 6810 35 1
/. Balamuth Block 360 1800 15 1
5
.
Kuru Block,
Rnanchi District
Total
4067 20335 104 4
149262 47109 246 1
From the above you will note that 9262 people worked on the above
projects daily and that 47109 people benefited daily.
The number of days worked at each center was as follows:
1. Latehar Block 22 days
2. Manika 31cck 22 days
3. Chandwa Block 19 days
4. Balemuth Block 12 days
5. Kuru Block,
Rnanchi District 18 days
In the month of March projects were open and under construction for
19 days. The figure is arrived at by averaging a number of days each
center had its projects open. In the month of April projects will
likely be under construction for 26 days. We anticipate completing the
above projects by July 16th, 1968.
In addition of the above projects we anticipate opening the following
additional projects by April 205h, 1968:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Latehar Block
Manika Block
Chandwa Block
Balumath Block
Nawghar Road - Bandhpur Bandh
School Building (1)
1 bandh
1 Road
Kuru Block, Rnanchi
District 5 well: and 2 bandhs
<J0
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ilton St.
Akron,
p.tic:: or mccs progr/ :
I am currently writing en the use of material aid in development as
my Master's Thesis topic. In addition to considerable study on tl
U.S. 3ovcrnm.cnt l s P.L. ^,80 program, I an attempting to analyze MCC's
use of material aid in three countries: India, Haiti and Jordan. As
part of this research I would appreciate your response to tie Question
listed below on the importance of naterial aid as viewed by contributors
to MCC.
During the past six years, 1072-1077, "CC's annual income averaged
approximately million dollars. Of this amount, 3 million or 33 per-
cent represented the value of the material aid portion. MCC has no
intention at present to eliminate or radically redv.ee the material ai 1
prorram. ~'ut in the event that there would be a radical reduction or
even elimination of the material aid program what effect would this
have on the overall contributions to !:CC? Any change would assume an
aucquasc and reasonable explanation for the change.
Please check one of the following:
1. V.'ould MCC yet its current !5G million and an extra S3 million
that no-.: comes in the form of material aid?
2. Would MCC yet the $G million and about one half the
naterial aid value, 31.5 million?
3. Would MCC yet only the $6 million?
4. Would :XC yet less than the $6 million?
Please return this letter with your response to the above four options
and any additional note you wish to add to ne in the enclosed envelope.
I an sendin- this letter to approximately 15 persons -..-ho v;or'.: closely
-..•its MCC's material aid and ?\j:\\ raising activity. Thank you for your
resnonse.
Paul Lon-acrc
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January 30, 1073
724 Fulton St.
Akron, PA 17 I
iestio::;:aire
I an currently working; on my Master's Thesis at Kansas State University.
My research topic relates to the use of material air., particularly its
development potential. In addition to doin~ considerable study oi the
impact of the U.S. Government's P.L. /I30 Program on developing countries,
I an analyzing MCC's use of material aid in three different countries.
These countries are, Haiti, India and Jordan with analysis for the years
bcr:/een 1052 and 107C.
It would be advantageous to interview you on your experience with
material aid in one of the above countries. Since that is not possible
I would appreciate it if you would fill out the enclosed brief question-
naire. I am only sensing the questionnaire to five persons related to
each of these countries, so it is important that every questionnaire
be returned. Also, since the number of questions is small, I will welcome
your elaboration on any of them. Statistical analysis of responses is
not my ~pal in this case. Rather, I am interested in your e::pericnccs
with material aid and overall perception.
A number of questions relate to the use of material aid in development.
It is not possible for me to precisely define what constitutes develop-
ment projects in each of the three countries. As a quide to you in
aaswerinq the questions related to development, I quote the definition
of development Edqar Stoess uses in the Development I.'onoqraph, Series
fr 1, Thoughts on Development : "...the process by which both persons an
societies come to realise the full potential of human life in a context
of social justice, v/ith an emphasis on self-reliance; economic -rowth
bcinq seen as one of the means for carrying forward this process."
I will be sharinq my findings with MCC. I have consulted with John
Hostetler and others in my research. I an not sure if the findinqs
will be printed in any form other than the final thesis. Please checi:
bach v/ith MCC or me in June if you wish to receive a report of my findin-s
in whatever shape they are available at that time.
Thank you for completing this questionnaire and returning it to me
promptly at ny home address, f»iven above.
Paul Lorn-acre
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QUESTIONNAIRE
In completing this questionnaire attempt to answer the questions in
terms of an average year.
1. VJhat percentage of material aid was distributed in a given year directly
under MCC's responsibility, and what percentage through second parties,
e.g., government , churches?
% solely MCC responsibility
Z second parties
2. Indicate the percentage of material aid distributed through the following
channels:
X institutions (hospitals, day care centers, schools, etc.)
% food-for-wcrk
% direct hand out
% other
3. Indicate the percentage of material aid distributed to meet the following
needs
:
% emergency relief
% development
% endemic needs (long term poverty)
% Institutional support
% other
U. V.Tiich staff person In your program had primary responsibility for the
material aid program?
MCC director
MCC expatriate specifically designed for this task
national staff person
anybody who was available
other
92a
5. Of the material aid distributed in your program approximately what
percentage was purchased locally?
0% 50%
25% 75%
6. Who made the primary decision as to where your material aid was
distributed?
HCC director
local government
local church or other society
other
7. Regarding the economic level of the population the material aid program
was directed to the:
lowest 10% of the population
lowest 25% of the population
lowest 50% of the population
8. Material aid was easier, about the same, more difficult to
administer following a disaster than in response to a situation of endemic
poverty?
9. Did you have adequate, less than adequate instructions from
MCC (Akron office) in setting goals for the material aid program?
10. List several economic and programatic/administrative factors used to
determine whether or not a material aid program should be initiated:
Economic Programatic/administrative
1. 1.
2. 2.
<J 3
11. Among these items which have most often been available in the MCC material
aid prof,rjm which were n.o.st useful in meeting ei • ncy, development and
endemic poverty needs? (Rank in order of importance, Indicating zero for
those of no value.)
Emergency Development Endemic
canned beef
wheat
milk
blankets
used clothing
yard goods
health kits
sewing kits
Christmas bundles
soap
12. List several factors which were most significant in making the material aid
program successful in your country.
1.
2.
3.
13. Did you feel the Akrcn administrator responsible for your country-
gave more, less, or about the same amount of care and
attention to the material aid program they gave to ether aspects of
the program.
14. If applicable, list ways in which nonfood items were used in development
programs
.
1.
2.
3.
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15. Did you feel that you had on your staff the necessary skills to administer
a material aid program effectively? yes, no. If "no," why not?
16. Did you feel that you or those on your staff responsible for the material
aid program had the necessary time to adequately administer the material
aid program? yes, no. If "no," why not?
17. Did your material aid program contribute toward, detract frcm,
or have a neutral effect upon your other development activity?
18. If "contribute toward" or "detracted from" was checked in the above
question, please indicate how or why this was true.
19. In what ways, if any, was food used for development purposes other than
in food-for-work projects?
20. In your opinion who determined the size of MCC's material aid program?
MCC Executive Committee and annual meeting
John Hostetler (MCC Material Aid Director)
need for material aid as perceived by the country director
or other responsible field staff
persons in constituency who make material aid available
Akron area administrator
other
21. If the dollar value of all the material aid that was available to you
would have been sent to you as cash in addition to the regular budget
in a given year, what percent would you have spent for material aid
purchases? 0%, 25%, 50%, 75%, 100%.
22. The following question pertains specifically to the portion of material
aid used in development activity: If the value of that material aid had
been available in cash, would the accomplishments have been greater,
about the same, or less than what was accomplished with the
material aid?
523. '.'ere you encouraged by the Akron office to use material aid in develop-
ment activities? yes, no. Why?
24. Did you receive a great deal of, soir.e
,
little, or no
satisfaction from administering the material aid aspect of your program?
25. What factors, if any, prevented you from using a greater percentage of
material aid for development?
1.
2.
3.
26. As you reflect en MCC's total world-wide material aid program, describe
its objective in a sentence or two.
27. Among the following, check the statements which most clearly reflect your
attitude toward MCC's total material aid program:
1. The material aid program should be discontinued entirely.
2. The material aid program should be discontinued except for
emergency disaster-type situations.
3. The current range of supply of MCC material aid items
should be reduced to about one-half the present number.
(If this item is checked, please list the four items in
question 11 you wish to see continued.)
4. MCC should use locally purchased items only (nearby country
purchase acceptable) .
5. Material aid program should be continued at about the
present level.
6. The material aid program should be expanded.
94a
(Answer 28-30 only If involved in food-for-work projects.)
28. In administration of food-for-work projects what was your usual practice?
a. food for 5 days
food for U days, cash for 1
food for 3 days, cash for 2
other
b. Food given was sufficient for:
worker only
3 family members
5 family members
7 family members
other
29. List your major difficulties related to food-for-work programs.
1.
30. What type of food-for-work activity provided the best development results?
construction of dams
construction of roads
construction of wells
construction of schools
terraces
other
95
APPENDIX D
THE ROLE OF MATERIAL AID
January 1978
A paper prepared by Edgar Stoesz, et.al. at the
request of the Executive Committee for presentation
to the MCC membership at the annual meeting for
further discussion and clarification.
MCC was organized to distribute food to Mennonite families in Russia.
MCC was from the beginning also involved in food production and what is
now known as development. In its second year twenty-five tractors
and plows were sent to the Ukraine to increase food production.
Relief and development have been for MCC from the beginning, and
remain, two vaid dimensions of a comprehensive ministry to human
suffering. The quantity of material aid has varied according to
world need but in recent years its value has been in the range of 25%
of the resources available to MCC.
The term material aid is meant to apply not only to food, primarily
wheat and meat, but also to such commodities as clothing, bandages,
bedding, yard goods, soaps, bundles, seeds, sewing and health kits and
medicines. It should not go unnoticed that these resources are used
for both development and relief programs.
The question which is with us constantly is one of priority and useful
guidelines on how best to respond to a wide range of needs. One
very general and broadly accepted definition is that relife is needed
to respond to emergencies resulting from war, drought, or whatever,
while development, including food production, is the more appropriate
response to endemic poverty. The distinction between an emergency
and poverty is, however, seldom that clear in practice. The sobering
fact is that millions live in perpetual poverty compounded by periodic
crises
.
While affirming the rightful role of relief, it would perhaps be useful
to discuss a few of the major problems MCC encounters in administering
relief programs, especially along side of development programs, and
suggest a few guidelines. These problems are not unique to MCC and they
are not new, though it does appear that they arise with increased
frequency and force. This may be because the needs MCC responds to
today are different from the needs of post World War II or starvation
in Russia.
1. MCC remains deeply committeed to both, but there are fundamental
differences between relief and development - some would even say
contradictions. Relief makes few demands on the recipient while
development is based primarily on self-initiative. Relief is
predicated on imports while development builds on indigenous
resources. Relief ministers to the neediest while development
works with those who respond and who are often not the neediest.
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A relief program may be effective in ministering to human suffering
but there is always the danger of creating dependencies if the
situation does not improve and it is necessary to continue the
program for more than several months. This is particularly true
where the cause of need is poverty as contrasted with an emergency.
An illustration is Bihar, India where MCC in the mid-sixties, in
cooperation with missions and other agencies, responded to
starvation with a sizeable relief program. Many lives were saved
and the value of dams, roads and wells resulting from the work,
people did for the food continues. Nevertheless, now more than
ten years later, MCC workers and missionaries observe that the
people continue to have a tendency to look for help to come from
the outside.
2. A second question is when supplies needed in a relief activity should
be imported from North America and when they should be purchased
locally? The answer would appear to be simply in a cost comparison,
but in practice the issue becomes very complex. MCC has donated
wheat in storage in Kansas and Canada but the preference is
frequently for rice, which often must be purchased from yet another
country. Do the cost calculations include freight, often
reimbursable by the U.S. Government, or do we consider only net MCC
costs? Can the needed commodity be purchased from the producer or
does local purchase mostly benefit a middleman? Will imports prove
to be a disincentive for domestic production by depressing prices?
Can the North American shipment be accomodated by the dock and
freight facilities without undue delay, waste or cost?
In practice MCC is finding it advantageous to purchase more material
aid supplies within the country or region of need but each deter-
mination must be made on its own merits.
3. Still another valid issue revolves around the need to coordinate
what is needed with supplies available. Rice is universally
preferred but wheat and corn are more readily available in North
America. MCC has red meat but people in food deficit countries
more commonly get their protein from beans and fish. North
American Mennonit women's groups like to prepare layette bundles,
and Christmas bundles made good Sunday School projects, and bundles
can be used to good advantage in some settings, but the distribution
must be selective. To what extent shall MCC help be predicated on
supplies available here but at best second choice for the recipients?
During 1978 the MCC overseas department is committed to continuing the
process already begun in 1977 to articulate and implement a more adequate
philosophy and strategy for the use of material aid. We believe the
following points deserve to be developed further among others.
1. MCC, in behalf of its supporting constituency and in obedience to the
Biblical injunction to feed the hungary, feels a responsibility to
minister to people in need regardless of their creed, political
affiliation, or the cause of their need.
2. Relief deserves to exist along with education, evangelism, medicine
and development in a comprehensive ministry to human suffering.
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the decision nail be made on tin Ls of:
a) Price/cost to MCC based on current market value of the commodit
(if salable) plus MCC act shipping costs.
b) .'. .' to deliver at the point of need without serious delay.
c) Sensitivity to sucb. considerations as:
i) The effect imports have on ongoing development activities -
ii) The effect failure to use a donated commodity would have on
the supporting constituency -
5. While granting the fundamental differences between relief and development,
continuing efforts shall be made to bring the two into a mutually comple-
Lship. This can be accomplished through providing for maxi-
mum recipient participation and the incorporation of development principles
to the extent feasible.
6. Precaution must be taken in planning programs, specifically relief programs,
to minimize the accompanying negative side effects including creating depend-
encies, retarding self-initiative, introducing foods into the diet which are
not grown locally, and distracting from domestic production.
7. Programs to increase food production and to provide nutrition education should
be introduced along with relief programs to minister to both the immediate
and the longer term needs.
3. When, for whatever reason, it is not possible to incorporate a needed relief
activity into an ongoing program, the relief program shall be facilitated
through a second track, thus permitting a ministry to the most destitute with-
out distracting from the ongoing program commitment.
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This study covers the Mennonite Central Committee's (MCC) use of
material aid, primarily wheat, in Haiti, India and Jordan bel -ad
1976. Particular focus is given to the use of material aid for development
purposes. The reports and records of field personnel on file with MCC were
primary source materials. These were supplemented by brief questionnaire
responses from 11 persons who were administratively responsible for
utilizing material aid in the three countries. Literature on the P.L. 480
program and disaster relief assistance is extensively reviewed. A list of
findings from the study includes recommendations for the material aid
program of MCC, or similar voluntary agencies.
Wider use of material aid was made in India, both for development
and other purposes, than in the other two countries. The larger population,
greater number of institutions served, more frequent disasters and more
acute poverty accounted for this greater material aid use.
Several factors influencing the use of material aid were studied.
It was found that the type of local cooperating agency, e.g. church or
school, was not a factor in success or failure; the interest and abilities
of MCC field personnel were a factor, but differences reported between
persons serving in the 1960s vs the 1970s were greater than differences
reported between the three countries; and government cooperation is crucial
to the success of a given project.
MCC use of material aid for development purposes resulted from the
need to provide food or cash for immediate relief rather than from a desire
to accomplish some development purpose. Food-for-work projects were an
effective way of accomplishing the primary purpose of providing emergency
food relief and achieving some development activity as a secondary
objective
.
Work projects can be made more effective if greater attention is
given to setting goals, assuring that other physical and technical inputs
are present and making the projects more community based. Food-for-work
projects are mainly successful in meeting temporary unemployment needs in
rural areas. They do not provide a solution to large urban unemployment.
